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Abstract 
Chef Executive Officer (CEO) compensation has become a very interesting topic 
of debate in finance literature. More recently, this topic has attracted considerable public 
attention due to the latest corporate scandals observed worldwide. 
The aim of this study will be to examine the impact of the CEO’s remuneration 
on the company performance of Portuguese companies, in the crisis (2008-2013) and after 
crisis (2014-2016) periods. 
This work addresses several research topics regarding executive compensation 
related to firm performance and it consists of four parts. In the first part, we review the 
literature on executive compensation and in the other three parts, we investigate a few 
critical questions in the executive compensation field. A panel data methodology is used 
to analyze the relationship between corporate performance and CEO compensation, in a 
sample composed by 37 Portuguese companies. 
Our main findings lead us to conclude that, in Portugal, at the time of the recent 
financial crisis, the CEO’s Remuneration is not determined by the Performance of the 
company and vice versa, since no empirical evidence has been found. According to the 
risk, we found that as CEO Remuneration increases, corporate risk decreases, that is, the 
risk variable does not significantly determine Remuneration. And finally, we also found 
that the remuneration increases with the increasing of CEO power, measured by Duality, 
Tenure and Equity Held.
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  Resumo 
A remuneração do Presidente do Conselho Executivo, também conhecido como 
CEO, tem se tornado um tópico de debate muito interessante na literatura financeira. 
Recentemente, este tópico atraiu consideravelmente a atenção do público, devido aos 
últimos escândalos financeiros observados internacionalmente.  
O objetivo deste estudo será examinar o impacto que a remuneração do CEO 
poderá ter no desempenho das empresas Portuguesas, durante a crise (2008-2013) e 
depois do período crise (2014-2016). 
Este estudo aborda vários tópicos de investigação relativos à relação entre a 
remuneração executiva e o desempenho da empresa, sendo composto por quatro partes. 
Na primeira parte, é feita uma revisão de literatura em remuneração executiva, e nas 
restantes três partes, são estudadas com maior detalhe algumas questões de teor crítico, 
no campo desta mesma área de estudo. É usada uma metodologia de dados em painel de 
maneira a analisar a relação entre o desempenho da empresa e a remuneração do CEO, 
numa amostra composta por 37 empresas Portuguesas. 
Os nossos principais resultados levam-nos a concluir que, em Portugal, no 
momento da crise financeira, a remuneração do Presidente do Conselho Executivo não é 
determinada através do desempenho da empresa, assim como, o contrário também não é 
verificado, uma vez que não é encontrada nenhuma evidência empírica. Relativamente à 
variável de risco, observámos que à medida que a remuneração do CEO aumenta, o risco 
da empresa diminui, o que implica que a variável do risco não determina 
significativamente a remuneração. E, por fim, também concluímos que a remuneração 
aumenta à medida que o poder do CEO também aumenta, sendo que o poder do CEO é 
medido através da dualidade de funções, do número de anos que este desempenha a 
função na empresa e, também, da quantidade de ações da empresa que possui. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between executive pay and firm performance is derived from 
agency theory (Hölmstrom (1979); Grossman and Hart (1983)) and it has been one of the 
most widely studied questions in the corporate governance literature (Frye (2004); Jensen 
and Murphy (1990); Murphy (1999)).  
The problem of how best to compensate executives is a classic application of the 
principal – agent theory. The principal (the shareholder) desires the agent (the manager) 
to maximize shareholder value but cannot accurately know the executive’s reaction 
function. However, the goals of the executives may be different from those of the 
shareholders. For instance, a manager may be more interested in amassing and defending 
personal power rather than pursuing profit maximizing strategies (Bebchuk & Fried Jesse, 
2003). As the literature shows, this agency problem could be mitigated through well-
structured compensation plans and that is the main focus of this research. 
Portugal is one of the countries that has most felt the economic crisis in recent 
times, having had the need to request for a financial rescue (bailout program), in 2011, to 
the European Commission and to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
Shortly after Portugal’s departure from “junk” S&P, Fitch and DBRS1 rating since 
September 2017 and the successive increases of the minimum wage, it is expected to be 
noted some changes in the compensation structures of the top management, so it becomes 
more and more important to study the extent to which high wages in the top positions will 
impact the company’s performance in the future.  
Executives constitute a larger group of workers than is commonly recognized, and 
the extraordinary pay 
increases received by 
CEOs of large firms had 
spillover effects in 
pulling up the pay of 
other executives and 
managers. Over the last 
                                               
1 DBRS – Dominion Bond Rating Service, a Canadian rating agency. 
Figure 1 – CEO Compensation and the S&P 500 Index (in 2013 
dollars), 1965-2013 
The Impact of the CEO’s Remuneration on Firm Performance during the 2011/2012 Financial Crisis – The Portuguese Case 
MASTER IN FINANCE 
 
2 
three decades, CEO compensation grew faster than that of other highly paid workers. All 
of those factors build up the motivation for this study. 
Thus, the present study aims to verify how the managerial compensation impacted 
on subsequent corporate performance and also how the managerial compensation 
structure affected a firm risk-taking behavior, in the crisis (2011-2013) and after crisis 
(2014-2016) periods, in companies that had a higher (management) compensation (in 
Euros) in the years before (2008-2010). To meet the goals, we will conduct an empirical 
research using the sample for testing the relationship between the performance of 
Portuguese traded companies and the remuneration structures, given to the top executives. 
The sample will be consisted of 47 Portuguese companies from 2008 to 2016. 
The performance of each company will be measured by return on assets (ROA), 
defined as the ratio of EBIT to the book value of the firm’s total assets. According to 
some authors, such as Murphy (1985) and Mehran (1995), accounting returns are highly 
important in determining executive compensation. On the other hand, risk will be 
measured as being related to firms’ stock market returns, assuming that a firm’s risk is 
associated with the variance of daily returns.  
Although there are already previous studies about this theme, made specifically 
about Portugal, for example some master dissertations in FEP, I believe my proposal will 
produce a difference and complete an existing gap in the literature. The main contribution 
to the literature is the timeframe chosen and the hypotheses tested. From 2009 to around 
2016, we witnessed the last big crisis in Portugal, being that a new important timeframe 
to study, which will make it possible to observe the impact of structural effects of the 
crisis on the relationship between the remuneration of the CEOs and the performance of 
the company. 
It is also important to mention the endogeneity problem with which we are 
potentially dealing, when analyzing firm performance and remuneration. “Endogeneity 
leads to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates that make reliable inference 
virtually impossible”(Roberts & Whited, 2012). So, one of the concerns of this study is 
to mitigate the endogeneity issue using methodologies that will be explained later. 
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The structure of this study will be the following: the first section will present a 
literature review, followed by the hypotheses development. In section 3, we then present 
the data and methodologies used while the major empirical results are shown in section 
4. The final section provides the major conclusions, the limitations of the study made and 
suggests a number of avenues for extending the research further.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Agency Problem – General Approach 
The relationship between stockholders and management is one kind of agency 
relationship. Such a relationship exists whenever someone (the principal) hires another 
(the agent) to represent his or her interests. In all such relationships, there is a possibility 
of a conflict of interest between the principal and the agent, which is called an agency 
problem. 
The agency problem could arise from different ownerships of the firm’s common 
stock, for example of a high ownership concentration in a company, which may lead to 
the extraction of the firm’s resources by the dominant owners at the expense of other 
shareholders; or from different time horizons (shareholders are concerned with the long-
term cash-flows while managers are more focused on the cash-flows that are linked with 
their presence on the firm (CEO’s tenure)2), and also because of different risk bearing by 
managers and shareholders (managers are portrayed as being risk –averse, so they may 
engage in activities which reduce the firm’s risk3, affecting consequently shareholder’s 
wealth; and, on the other hand, shareholders are considered to be risk-neutral because 
they can diversify firm-specific risk simply by holding a diversified portfolio). 
Agency Theory is the subject that addresses problems that arise due to differences 
between the goals or desires of a principal and an agent and is concerned with resolving 
problems that arise from this. The agency problems derived from these agency 
relationships could be mitigated through managerial incentive systems (that is considered 
an internal mechanism), which could also bring an agency problem itself, as it will be 
addressed later on. 
2.2. Executive Compensation 
2.2.1. Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem 
Compensation of corporate executives continues to be a hot-button issue in 
Corporate Governance research. 
                                               
2 This problem gets worse when managers’ retirement gets closer, since they have short 
perspectives about investments, choosing projects with short-term returns, which could simply not 
maximize the firm value. 
3 See Jensen and Meckling (1976); Amihud and Lev (1981). 
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Boards are one of the most important corporate governance mechanisms that 
monitor and evaluate management – supervisory role -, make managerial decisions such 
as which projects to undertake and which employees to hire – managerial role -, and offer 
valuable advices – advisory role – which are especially important in certain types of firms 
(Fernandes et al., 2017). The CEO is the individual ultimately responsible for the firm’s 
investments, operating activities, human resources management, financing decisions and 
overall firm performance (Core & Guay, 2010). As a result, managerial compensation 
should be constructed not only to retain competent managers, but to align managers’ 
interests with those of stockholders as much as possible, in a way that maximizes firm 
value. 
Figure 2 - Hypothetical Organization Chart, 
 Ross, Stephen A., Corporate Finance 
 
One of the main objectives of any manager is to have the highest remuneration 
possible for the exercise of his functions, regardless of his/her effort. Managers are the 
ones that take the toughest decisions in a company and their actions will affect the returns 
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of shareholders, so it is important to induce them to act in the best interests of the 
shareholders (Aggarwal & Samwick, 1999).  
However, managerial compensation could be seen as an agency problem as there 
could exist conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders, since managers 
could manipulate the company results, in order to afford the maximum individual 
compensation, as showed by Holthausen et al. (1995). 
According to agency theory, in publicly traded companies where ownership is 
separated from the management, managers are likely to use their power and discretion to 
pursue their self-interests, such as empire building, position entrenchment and 
enlargement of pay packages (Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002). 
Baumol (1959) and Marris (1963) assert that a CEO is more concerned with the 
size or growth rate of the firm than with profitability. They claim a concern with size or 
growth occurs because compensation plans link pay to these characteristics and because 
greater prestige is associated with the management of a large firm. 
According to Murphy (1985), agency problems result because managers have 
monopoly access to the information required to construct and administer compensation 
plans. These compensation plans ideally tie the self-interest of the managers to the 
interests of outside shareholders, but managers may withhold some relevant information 
from compensation committees when that information would attribute poor firm 
performance to bad management. 
Core et al. (1999) found that firms with weaker corporate governance structures 
have greater agency problems; CEOs at firms with greater agency problems receive 
greater compensation; and firms with greater agency problems perform worse. 
Efing et al. (2015) observe that executive pay could also be related to corporate 
governance problems and the weakness of shareholder rights. While excessive risk-taking 
may only manifest itself in the long run, short-run cash payouts can be enormous and 
performance measures may not properly account for long-term risks. 
Sigler (2011) states that the components of executive compensation (cash bonus, 
incentive plans, stock options and restricted stock awards) may induce managers to 
engage in activities that produces problems for firm and, thus, creating agency problems. 
For example, cash bonuses may encourage undesired behavior as manipulation of the 
timing of revenues and expenses to maximize pay out. In addition, the stock options could 
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not reflect the executive’s effort to improve company performance, given that, the stock 
price may rise or fall from external market forces and not from actions made company’s 
executives. It could actually be a disincentive. In other instances, executives could be 
enticed to manipulate accounting numbers when they are about to exercise their options 
to give the appearance of superior firm performance to drive up the stock price. 
2.2.2. Components of Executive Compensation 
The form of compensation is what motivates managers to increase firm value, 
being an important factor of the success of a company. In this context, a well-structured 
remuneration package could be a good incentive to the top management, reducing or even 
eliminating the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers. 
According to Sigler (2011), the components of executive compensation are: base 
salary; incentive plans; and, other benefits as golden parachute4, retirement plans, life 
insurance and health insurance, car allowances, health-club membership, travel 
reimbursements, paid holidays and vacations. 
The incentive plans are composed by: 1) cash bonuses upon reaching a preset goal, 
being designed to motivate the executive to focus on the bottom line of the company in 
order to increase his personal wealth; 2) executive stock options to motivate top 
management to work in the shareholders’ best interests. It could reduce excessive risk 
aversion, by giving the executive incentives for accepting risky profitable projects instead 
of avoiding them, thus increasing firm risk; and, 3) Restricted stocks, which could have 
some limitations, in the way that, it requires a period of time (the so called vesting period, 
which is the amount of time before the restrictions are lifted from the sale of the stock) to 
pass or for a certain goal to be achieved before the executive can sell the stock.  
The long-term incentives are used for motivating top executives to reach the goals 
of the company and could also prevent the top executives from going to work for other 
firms. 
In the field of incentives contracts, Smith, Watts and Jensen (1985), stated three 
types of contract incentives: compensation unrelated to firm performance composed by 
salary, pension and insurance; compensation related to stock market firm performance 
                                               
4 Golden parachute is a lucrative benefit given to the top executives in the event that a company is 
taken over by another firm that results in the loss of their job. It could include stock options, bonuses and 
severance pay. 
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composed by stock options and phantom stocks; and compensation related to firm 
operating (accounting) performance composed by bonus and a percentage of earnings. 
According to Mehran (1995), equity-based compensation belongs to the stock-
market based compensation kind. This type of compensation is non-cash remuneration 
that translates into ownership in the firm. This can take many forms, including options, 
restricted stock and performance shares. Equity compensation allows the employees of 
the firm to share in the profits via appreciation and can encourage retention, particularly 
if there are vesting requirements. It is more common among outside directors. Thus, it 
has been said that a board composed by outside directors (those who do not work for the 
company) are more independent from top management and may thus better represent the 
interests of shareholders than do inside directors. However, according to Mehran (1995), 
there is no significant relationship between firm performance and board composition. 
Smith and Watts (1983) present evidence indicating that the value of stock options 
held by a manager at the beginning of a year gives him/her an incentive to act in ways 
which can maximize stockholder wealth throughout that year. 
Stock-based performance measures often are argued to be superior to accounting-
based measures because accounting rules and conventions preclude accounting-based 
performance measures from reflecting the entire value relevant information set that is 
impounded in price. For example, while accounting returns may represent a reasonable 
measure of a CEO’s current management of assets in place, they do not reflect the benefits 
of a CEO’s current strategy planning, growth opportunities identified, business initiatives 
or investments in the discovery and development of new products or technologies with 
deferred returns. However, the stock price itself may not fully reflect or may inadequately 
reflect valuable contracting information because managers may have better information 
than investors about how their activities and efforts are being directed to increase firm 
value in the long run (Bushman et al., 1996). 
Notwithstanding, Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) state that pay packages based 
exclusively on stock price performance are inefficient methods for compensating risk-
averse executives, since stock price variation is influenced by factors such as monetary 
policy, tax laws, or other political events outside the executive’s control. Risk-averse 
executives would demand pay premiums to compensate for the windfall gains and losses 
in pay that would be caused by these events. 
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Murphy (1985) presents evidence that executive compensation is strongly 
positively related to corporate performance as measured by shareholder return and growth 
in sales. Consequently, tying managers’ compensation to current performance, 
entrepreneurial ability, managerial responsibility, firm size and past performance may 
motivate them to make more value-maximizing decisions. And, according to Coughlan 
and Schmidt (1984), by linking pay and sales growth, a board can tie pay to measurable 
results in a manner that protects the CEO from the effects of outside events on stock price. 
Compensation changes and management changes (M&A, takeovers) are methods 
to control top management. For example, M&A may result in the rewriting of managers 
compensation contracts, so those changes are avoided by managers because they fear 
losing their jobs, status, power or/and prestige. However, this could be very good to 
increase firm performance, so it’s important to design some good management 
compensation procedures (Jensen & Ruback, 1983).  
Moreover, Bebchuk et al. (2011) investigated the relationship between the CEO 
pay slice (CPS) and the value, performance and behavior of public firms. They find a 
negative correlation between CPS and firm performance, which could be justified by an 
optimal selection problem. Since the optimal level of CPS or the importance of the CEO 
could be higher for lower value firms and the identified pattern could be due to the 
tendency of such firms to choose high CPS levels or by an agency problem explanation, 
where high excess CPS could reflect agency and governance problems. 
While some authors may claim that the incentives of the manager and the firm’s 
owners remain divergent, the existence of competition in capital markets makes the 
survival of corporations depend on the construction of incentive arrangements which 
encourage top management to act in the shareholders’ interest. Firms which fail to 
compensate managers in this way will face higher costs and thus will not compete 
successfully with firms whose managers act in the shareholders’ interest. 
There are two approaches to design incentive schemes: the Arm’s Length 
approach and the Managerial Power approach.  
 The Arm’s Length approach, also known as Optimal Contracting theory, is when 
executive compensation is designed by board of directors at arm’s length with proper 
incentives to create value to the shareholders and to the firm. There is a positive 
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relationship between pay and performance (Duffhues & Kabir, 2008). Executive 
compensation is used as a remedy to the agency problem (Kuo et al., 2014). 
The Managerial Power approach is when managers with some level of control 
tend to influence their own compensation arrangements; the manager uses his influence 
to “force” the board to pay him more. In this case, managerial entrenchment and moral 
hazard could occur. According to this theory and taking into account the study of Bebchuk 
and Fried Jesse (2003), there is a negative relationship between pay and performance . 
The evidence shows that pay is higher when executives have more controlling power; pay 
is also higher when the CEO is simultaneously the chairman of the board, when the 
corporate governance mechanisms are less effective and when the board is larger, older 
and subject to CEO’s control (Core et al., 1999); and, there exists pay for luck – less pay 
for luck in periods of bad luck (when pay for luck reduces compensation) than in periods 
of good luck (Garvey and Milbourn, 2006). In addition, Campbell and Thompson (2015) 
also find that CEOs are rewarded with higher pay for good luck and minimally penalized 
with lower pay for bad luck. Pay-for-luck relationship could be due to powerful CEOs 
who influence the compensation contracting process (Garvey and Milbourn, 2006). 
Amzaleg et al. (2014) find that when CEO has high control power vis-à-vis the 
board of directors, he might use his controlling power to push for higher pay-performance 
sensitivity and for a lower pay-performance sensitivity when expecting a tough period. 
However, it is not obvious if this adversely affects the firm or not. On one hand, this 
allows CEO to take a higher pay and thus comes at the expense of the firm. On the other 
hand, if the CEO can have positive impact on the firm’s profits by exerting more effort 
and the sensitivity of the firm’s performance to the CEO’s effort is higher in good periods 
than in bad periods, it could be beneficial to the owners of the firm, as this provides more 
incentives to the CEO to exert effort when such effort is more important. 
Core and Guay (2010) state that CEO compensation can be thought of as the sum 
of four separate components: 1) compensation for ability (minimum amount necessary to 
attract the CEO to the job and persuade him to forgo his next most attractive opportunity), 
2) a payment that increases with the level of effort required of the CEO, 3) a premium for 
risk stemming from performance-based incentive risk, and 4) any excess pay (any portion 
that could not be explained by the other 3 components). 
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Hill et al. (2016), in order to find whether or not CEO compensation is excessive, 
using an extension of the model of Core and Guay (2010)5, find that there are components 
of CEO compensation that are not economically justified being therefore considered 
excessive and consistent with the Managerial Power approach. 
Beyond shadow of doubt, one may conclude that it is not possible to design a 
complete incentive package. Otherwise there would not exist agency risks and, 
consequently, agency costs. In reality, we cannot predict all kinds of situations, especially 
the opportunistic ones, which makes it difficult to ensure optimal contracts. 
2.2.3. Executive Compensation and Firm Performance 
Executive compensation and firm performance relationship is based on the agency 
theory, which assumes that individuals are rational, risk adverse and prone to taking 
actions that maximize personal welfare and minimize effort (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
To emphasize this, Core and Guay (2010) assume that CEOs like wealth, dislike 
effort and dislike risk. So, it could be an optimal situation, if the executive compensation 
was combined with the performance measures of the company, using a compensation 
scheme that rewards (penalizes) the CEO for increases (decreases) in shareholder value. 
This feature of the compensation plan commonly referred to as “pay-for-performance”. 
Gabaix and Landier (2008) predict that CEO’s equilibrium pay is increasing with 
both the size of his firm and the size of the average firm in the economy. In addition, 
according to Rayton (2003), managers will maximize firm value if they receive net 
increases in utility from such behavior, and the magnitude of the link between pay and 
performance is commonly interpreted as a measure of these incentives.  
When we have the goals of shareholders and managers aligned, the agency costs 
will be lower, so it would be important to relate the remuneration package with 
performance measures, in order to achieve such alignment. As Rayton (2003) concludes, 
companies that better link the pay of employees to performance, will experience less 
agency costs and, consequently, exhibit better performance. 
High remuneration focuses on changes in the marginal productivity of corporate 
leadership in a competitive labor market for executives (Gabaix and Landier, 2006). 
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Philippon and Reshef (2012) argue that increased wages in the financial industry may 
simply reflect changes in the working environment, including an increase in skill 
intensity, job complexity and earning risks. Some recent literature, such as Efing et al. 
(2015), suggests that there is a competition for talented workers, which could be the 
explanation to high salaries. Moreover, companies seem to raise their executives’ pay 
after losing executives to other firms (Gao et al., 2013). 
2.3. Executive Compensation and Risk Taking 
It has been often argued that remuneration and incentive systems have played a 
key role in influencing risk-taking. 
It is important to study the field of risk-taking behavior as Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, in 2011, stated: “Risk-taking incentives provided by incentive 
compensations arrangements in the financial services industry were a contributing factor 
to the financial crisis that began in 2007” (p.1) 
The recent financial crisis demonstrated the dangers associated with managerial 
compensation schemes that create asymmetries between the optimal risk for the firm and 
the risk that the incentive schemes encourage managers to take (Amzaleg et al., 2014). 
The Senior Supervisors Group (2008, p.7) noted that  
“an issue for a number of firms is whether compensation and other 
incentives have been sufficiently well designed to achieve an appropriate 
balance between risk appetite and risk controls, between short run and longer 
run performance, and between individual or local business unit goals and 
firm wide objectives”. 
Francis et al. (2015) observe that change in competition combined with change in 
managerial compensation captures significantly more of the increased risk in firm value 
and shareholder-equity. 
In quantitative risk management, the focus lies on how to improve the 
measurement and management of specific risks such as liquidity risk, credit risk and 
market risk (Aebi et al., 2012). 
Fahlenbrach (2008) shows that firms with weak corporate governance structures, 
such as CEO/chair duality, more employee directors and little monitoring by large 
shareholders, tend to allow contracts with larger pay-for-performance components, since 
it can allow CEOs to unduly influence their compensation contracts. Yet, weak 
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governance could also influence the quality of risk management and thus impact firm 
risk-taking and crisis performance more directly. 
DeYoung et al. (2013) find larger systematic and idiosyncratic risk for 
corporations with more performance-sensitive CEO compensation and Hagendorff and 
Vallascas (2011) show that they are more likely to engage in risk-inducing mergers. 
Bolton et al. (2015) find that it is useful to integrate CDS (credit default swaps) 
in compensation contracts, because CDS provide a market price for risk, which, when 
weighted correctly in a compensation contract that includes an equity component, can 
provide first-best risk incentives. It could also reduce agency costs and is thus cheaper 
for shareholders. 
2.3.1. Stock Options Role 
Stock ownership provides one of the most direct links between shareholder and 
CEO wealth (Murphy, 1999). 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) state that managerial compensation will be 
correlated with the total return to shareholders, typically through ownership of the firm’s 
stock or options on the firm’s stock. This variable component of executive compensation 
is measured through performance measures and will induce the manager to act in the way 
of maximizing the firm value. 
Gormley et al. (2013) study how boards adjust incentives in response to firms’ 
risk and how these incentives affect managers’ risk-taking. They find that, after left-tail 
risk increases, boards reduce managers’ exposure to stock price movements and that less 
convexity from options-based pay leads to greater risk-reducing activities. Specifically, 
managers with less convex payoffs tend to cut leverage and R&D, stockpile cash and 
engage in more diversifying acquisitions. 
Stock options provide managers with incentives to take risks because managers 
share in the gains but not all the losses (Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977), 
C. W. Smith and Stulz (1985), and C. W. Smith and Watts (1992). Because options 
contain a leveraged position in the firm’s equity, options also have the potential to 
magnify a risk-averse manager’s exposure to the firm’s risk and thus reduce the 
manager’s appetite for risk taking (Lambert et al., 1991). 
Stock-option plans are viewed as a means by which CEOs can (inefficiently) 
increase their own compensation under the camouflage of (efficiently) improving 
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incentives and thus without encountering shareholder resistance (Gabaix and Landier, 
2008). 
According to Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), pay-performance sensitivity for 
executives at firms with the least volatile stock prices is an order of magnitude greater 
than the pay-performance sensitivity for executives at firms with the most volatile stock 
prices. Executives in firms with more volatile stock prices will have less performance-
based compensation, because the pay-performance sensitivity will be decreasing in the 
riskiness or variance of the firm’s performance (Garen, 1994). Similar previous studies 
were conducted in this subject – principal-agent model and the relative performance 
evaluation6, but the conclusion reached by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) is that the pay-
performance sensitivities of both CEOs and other executives are decreasing in the 
variance of their firms’ stock returns for a variety of measures of compensation. Omitting 
the variance of a firms’ stock returns leads to downward-biased estimates of the pay-
performance sensitivity. Relative performance evaluation considerations are not 
incorporated into executive compensation contracts, but it could be good because of 
strategic interactions between managers at rival firms. 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) report that the incentive effects of options depend 
on the CEO’s shareholdings, because they would be diluted in the CEO’s portfolio if he 
had large holdings. When the CEO’s portfolio of options is composed mostly of in-the-
money options, the incentive effects of options do not differ much from the incentive 
effects of common stock holdings. Additionally, keeping the CEO’s wealth constant, 
greater sensitivity of this wealth to increases in the volatility of his firm’s stock return 
brought about by greater stock option holdings would increase the CEO’s incentives to 
take risks as long as these options are not too much in the money. But, generally, granting 
options also affects the CEO’s wealth, which can change his willingness to take risks 
(Ross, 2004). 
According to Coles et al. (2006), higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock 
volatility implements riskier policy choices, including relatively more investment in 
R&D, less investment in property, plant and equipment, more focus and higher leverage. 
Moreover, riskier policy choices generally lead to compensation structures with higher 
vega (stock volatility) and lower delta (stock price). 
                                               
6 It is suggested to see Garen (1994), Lambert and Larcker (1987) and Janakiraman et al. (1992). 
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The sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price (delta) is seen as aligning the 
incentives of managers with the interests of shareholders. Higher delta can mean that 
managers will work harder or more effectively because managers share gains and losses 
with shareholders. Higher delta can also expose managers to more risk. It is possible that 
managers will forgo some positive net present value (NPV) projects if those projects are 
very risky, providing a strong incentive to decrease R&D expenditures, increase capital 
expenditures and decrease leverage. 
On the other hand, higher stock volatility leads to riskier policy choices. In 
particular, higher stock volatility implies significantly higher R&D expenditures, less 
investment in property, plant and equipment and an increased focus as measured by both 
the Herfindahl index (for sales across segments) and the number of business segments. 
Higher stock volatility is also associated with higher book leverage and market leverage. 
 
2.4. Executive Compensation and the Financial Crisis 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis has been described as the most serious crisis since 
the Great Depression with important effects in the real economy. 
The financial crisis following the subprime meltdown in the US has led to a further 
growing awareness and need for appropriate risk management techniques and structures 
within organizations around the world. 
As KPMG said: 
“(…) Recession related risks as well as the quality of the company’s 
risk intelligence are two of the major oversight concerns for audit committee 
members. But there is also concern about the culture, tone and incentives 
underlying the company’s risk environment, with many saying that the board 
and/or audit committee needs to improve their effectiveness in addressing 
risks that may be driven by the company’s incentive compensation structure”. 
It is important to have in mind that, in a situation of crisis, with some existing 
agency problems, the increase of corporate risk levels may cause bankruptcies and severe 
damage to long-term companies’ value and job creation (Díez-Esteban et al., 2016).  
This 2007-2008 financial crisis not only resulted in the collapse of well-known 
financial institutions such as Lehman Brothers, but also halted global credit markets and 
required unprecedented government intervention worldwide (Erkens et al., 2012). 
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Regarding the particular case of Portugal, a country that suffered a bailout after 
the financial crisis 2007-2008 from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
European Commission, in the first half of 2011, it becomes important to verify the links 
between compensation and performance (testing the theories of Arms’ Length and 
Managerial Power) and also how the managerial compensation structure affected firm 
risk-raking behavior, during and after the crisis of 2011/2012, in companies that had a 
higher (management) compensation in the years before (2009-2010). 
Even though, in times of economic and financial crisis, it is common for 
companies to show a decrease in the values of their financial statements and main 
economic indicators, it is important to clarify, with this study, the question whether the 
relation between pay and performance became weaker or stronger during the crisis. 
 
Figure 3 – Changes to GDP in selected countries, 2008-2012,  
Karanikolos et al. (2013)7 
 
 
                                               
7 GDP in Q1, 2008=100%.  
Source: Organization for Economic Co-operations and Development database. 
GDP = gross domestic product. 
Q = quarter. 
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Figure 4 – Changes to GDP in Portugal, 2007-2017 
 
Fahlenbranch and Stulz (2011) analyze the influence of CEO incentives and share 
ownership on bank performance and find no evidence of a better performance of banks 
in which the incentives provided by the CEO’s pay package are stronger (i.e., the fraction 
of equity-based compensation is higher). In fact, their evidence rather points to banks 
providing stronger incentives to CEOs performing worse in the crisis. A possible 
explanation for this finding is that CEOs may have focused on the interests of 
shareholders in the build-up to the crisis and took actions that they believed the market 
would welcome. Ex post, however, these actions were costly to their banks and their 
shareholders when results turned out to be poor. Moreover, their results indicate that bank 
CEOs did not reduce their stock holdings in anticipation of the crisis and the CEOs did 
not hedge their holdings. Hence, their results suggest that bank CEOs did not anticipate 
the crisis and the resulting poor performance of the banks as they suffered huge losses 
themselves. 
Erkens et al. (2012) investigate the relation between corporate governance and 
performance of financial firms during the credit crisis of 2007/2008 using an international 
sample of 296 financial firms from 30 countries. They find that firms with more 
independent boards and higher institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns 
during the crisis. They argue that firms with higher institutional ownership took losses 
during the crisis period. Moreover, firms with more independent boards raised more 
equity capital during the crisis, which led to a wealth transfer from existing shareholders 
to debtholders. 
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According to some conclusions of Aebi et al. (2012), banks were pushed by their 
boards to maximize shareholder wealth before the crisis and took risks that were 
understood to create wealth but later turned out poorly in the credit crisis.  
They also conclude that banks, to be better prepared to face the next financial 
crisis, have to significantly improve the quality and profile of their risk management 
function, but also embed the appropriate risk governance having CEO and CRO at the 
same level, ideally both reporting to the board of directors. This, however, may come at 
the cost of a lower performance in a normal market environment (i.e., Non-crisis). 
Fernandes et al. (2017) examine whether and to what extent do board’s 
characteristics influence their performance in crisis and they find evidence that banks’ 
performance during the financial crisis is a function of their board’s characteristics. 
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3.  Hypotheses Development 
Executive compensation and firm performance relationship is based on Agency 
Theory, having been proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The authors noted that 
the empowerment may generate conflicts of interests, so that the manager can pursue 
objectives that do not necessarily lead to the maximization of the firm value and the 
shareholder wealth. 
Thus, one way of minimizing agency risk could be the inclusion of the pay-for-
performance methodology (Core and Guay, 2010).  
With the first hypothesis of Erro! Autorreferência de marcador inválida., it is 
expected that, if better management decisions can be achieved through higher relative 
variable component of compensation, the subsequent performance of firms paying more 
should be superior to the performance of firms paying less. So, assuming that there is a 
clear relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance, we expect a 
positive relationship between those two variables during and after the financial crisis. 
Following Mehran (1995), a good measure capable of valuing the performance of a 
company is the Return on Assets (ROA). To perform this hypothesis, we will use a 
dummy variable (CrisisD) that equals to one when we are in the crisis period (2008-2013) 
and zero when we are in the after-crisis period (2013-2016). 
According to the Senior Supervisors Group (2008), it is important to have an 
appropriate balance between risk appetite and risk controls, between short run and longer 
run and between firm wide objectives. The literature on Agency Theory (for example, 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999)) shows that the risk-averse managers tend to prefer more 
fixed remuneration levels, while less risk-averse managers tend to “demand” a higher 
weight of the variable component (seen as a way of rewarding the good performance of 
the company).  
So, one of the main objectives of this study, as it is presented in the second 
hypothesis of Erro! Autorreferência de marcador inválida., is also to understand if the 
fact that the CEOs in Portugal receive higher remunerations will influence the likelihood 
of engaging in risk-inducing actions, which could also bring some benefits to the 
company. In this hypothesis, the variable risk will be measured as the standard deviation 
of the weekly returns of the company shares and there are no defined expectations in the 
final values, since there is no consensus among the literature. Some authors, such as 
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Amzaleg et al. (2014) and Aebi et al. (2012) argue that larger variable component of 
remuneration will increase managers’ risk appetite. However, authors such as Lambert et 
al. (1991) argue that if compensation structures include stock options, they may even 
reduce managers’ risk appetite, since options contain a leveraged position in the firm’s 
equity, thus, increasing risk-averse manager’s exposure to the firm’s risk. And, also, if 
the volatility is higher, the firm can reward the CEO with stock options and less cash 
incentives because the value will increase with stock return volatility. 
Still in this study, and as the last hypothesis of Erro! Autorreferência de 
marcador inválida., we will analyze the power of the CEO in Portuguese companies and 
whether this will influence the received remunerations throughout his top management. 
According to the literature, for example Amzaleg et al. (2014), our expectations point to 
a positive relationship between power of the CEO and high remunerations since, and 
according to Hill et al. (2016), more powerful CEOs can influence their own 
compensation,  To measure the CEO power, we will use three variables: duality, tenure 
and pay slice. Duality is when the CEO holds the dual roles of CEO and Chairman of the 
Board. Tenure measures the years that a CEO stays in the same position in a company. 
Lastly, we consider the ratio of CEO compensation compared to the total compensation 
for the executives of the Board (pay slice). 
Table 1- Hypotheses Development 
Hypothesis Measurement of Variable  Expected Signal Authors 
1. Higher CEO’s variable 
remuneration prior the 
financial crisis increases 
firm performance during 
financial crisis. CEO’s 
variable remuneration will 
be measured in absolute 
terms (log) and relative 
terms. 
• Performance: measured by 
return on assets (ROA), 
measured by the ratio of EBIT 
to the book value of the firm’s 
total assets. Due to the 2SLS 
regression analysis, this 
variable is used as dependent 
and independent variable. 
( + ) 
Bebchuk et al. (2011) 
Core and Guay (2010) 
Rayton (2003) 
2. Higher CEO’s total 
remuneration prior the 
financial crisis increases 
appetite for risk during 
financial crisis. 
• Risk: variance of weekly 
returns. It is used as 
independent variable. ( +/- ) 
Gormley et al. (2013) 
Francis et al. (2015) 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) 
Sigler (2011) 
 
3. More powerful CEOs are 
more likely to receive 
higher remunerations than 
are less powerful CEOs 
during the financial crisis. 
• CEO Power: measured by the 
duality, tenure, equity held or 
CEO pay slice.  They are used 
as independent variables. CEO 
pay slice is also used as 
( + ) 
Hill et al. (2016) 
Amzaleg et al. (2014) 
Aebi et al. (2012) 
Adams et al. (2005) 
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dependent variable due to 2SLS 
regression analysis. 
 
4. Methodology and Data Collection 
4.1. Data Collection 
According to the European Transparency Directive (Directive 2004/109/EC), all 
the listed companies on the European regulated markets have the obligation to provide 
information for investors through a regular flow of disclosure of periodic and on-going 
regulated information and the dissemination of such information to the public. The aim 
of these amendments is to establish an increase in transparency at the capital markets and 
in investor protection to meet information deficits in a developing financial market 
environment. 
In addition, the Portuguese stock market regulator (CMVM) also obliges firms to 
disclose information such as the financial reports (Annual Reports), information on major 
holdings of voting rights and Corporate Governance Reports. 
To perform this study, the collection of the data was done directly through the 
Annual Reports of the companies of the sample collected on their company sites, as well 
as through some well-known databases, such as Eikon Thomson Reuteurs and Amadeus. 
The sample consists of 37 different companies listed in the Portuguese stock 
market – Euronext Lisbon (of the initial sample of 47 companies, three were dropped 
because of non-matching fiscal years, four companies were deleted because of missing 
data and, finally, three were excluded from the sample because they were financial 
institutions and these were not the main focus of this study), for 8 years (2008-2016). 
Only companies that provide information on the number of managers and their 
remuneration were considered in the analysis. 
The main objective of this study is to verify what is the relationship between 
CEO’s remuneration and performance of the company. With this purpose, data was 
collected from companies’ financial and corporate governance reports. 
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The CEO’s remuneration is divided into two parts: fixed and variable, this last one 
being, according to the Agency Theory principles, the one that most represents the 
participation on the performance of the company and is able to potentially align the 
interests between managers and shareholders, leading to the maximization of the value of 
the company. The variable component of remuneration may also include stocks and 
options. In this sense, we sought to obtain detailed information about the percentage of 
the share capital of the company owned by the CEO. At the same time, we looked for 
information on whether companies had stock and options plans, as their existence may 
have an impact on performance. 
Thus, the data collection will be focused not only on the remuneration part but 
also on those factors that characterize the company in an operating and accounting way 
that could be impacting the CEO’s remuneration, such as operating results, firm’s size, 
stock returns, risk and CEO power. 
In each Annual Report we attempt, through a very rigorous analysis, to obtain 
detailed information about the earned remuneration by each top manager, particularly by 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and also the possible existence of duality8 in the 
company. However, we observed a qualitative improvement in the information provided 
by the Annual Reports of the Portuguese companies that make up this study over the 
years, whereby in the early years (2008, 2009 and 2010) of this study, there was a greater 
difficulty in obtaining the exact data of the remuneration of CEOs, since the opinion of 
most companies was that the individual disclosure of the compensation did not translate 
into a more faithful view of the company, in addition to potentially violating the privacy 
of each executive. In the companies where this was observed, we used a proxy for the 
true remuneration of the CEO: were computed, in the last years where the data is 
available, the ratio between CEO pay and other members average pay and it was used this 
ratio to estimate CEO pay in the initial years; this method was individualized for each 
company of the sample. 
So, in summary, we collected the following items for the years in study (2008-
2016): (1) net income, (2) total assets, (3) weekly returns (computed), (4) the name of the 
firm’s CEO (5) the name of the firm’s Chairman, (6) existence of  CEO duality, (7) tenure 
of the CEO, (8) fixed remuneration of the CEO, (9) variable remuneration of the CEO, 
                                               
8 When the CEO also holds the position of the chairman of the board. 
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(10) total remuneration of the CEO, (11) total remuneration of the executives of the 
Board, (12) percentage of the variable remuneration to the total remuneration, (13) 
percentage of CEO’s pay slice9, (14) number of shares held by executives, (15) number 
of top managers employed by the firm, (16) number of non-executives members of the 
board, (17) number of independent non-executives members of the board, (18) number 
of members that composed the Remuneration Committee, (19) intangible assets, (20) 
long-term debt. 
4.2. Dependent and Independent Variables 
Although the theme of this study is the relationship between remuneration of 
CEOs and performance, there are many other variables included in this study, in order to 
better control the factors that may help to isolate the impact of the CEO’s remuneration 
on the firm performance in Portugal, from 2008 to 2016. 
The firm size is measured by the total assets of the companies of the sample. 
According to this measure, the sample is stratified according to the definition adopted by 
the European Commission, in 2003 (Commission Recommendation 2003/361/CE). Thus, 
a company that presents a value of total assets of less than or equal to 10 million euros, 
will be considered a small-sized company; a company that presents a value of total assets 
of more than 10 million euros and less or equal to 43 million euros, will be considered a 
medium-sized company; and, finally, a company with a value of total assets of more than 
43 million euros, will be considered a large-sized company. These are ordinal variables 
used to stratify the sample.  
Following the specification used by Euronext Lisbon, the companies of the sample 
were divided according their activity sector – Industrials, Consumer Services, Basic 
Materials, Technology, Consumer Goods, Utilities and Telecommunications. This is a 
nominal variable used to stratify the sample. 
The proxy for firm performance is the return on assets (ROA), measured by the 
ratio of EBIT to the book value of the firm’s total assets, as measured on a study 
performed by Core et al. (1999).  An argument for using ROA is that accounting returns 
are highly important in determining executive compensation, in the way that they provide 
information to the board about the value added to the firm by the CEO. Therefore, 
                                               
9 The mean of this variable is explained later in the chapter. 
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executives have incentives to make major corporate decisions and/or report income in 
such way as to affect ROA and, thus, their compensation (Mehran, 1995).  
The CEO remuneration is based on three different measures of compensation: 
total compensation, fixed remuneration and variable remuneration. Fixed remuneration 
simply measures the component of compensation that is fixed, whereas the variable 
remuneration measures the component of compensation that is not fixed, that could 
include annual bonuses, stock options and stocks and performance plans. The total 
compensation is the sum of these two. In the hypotheses under study, it makes more sense 
to use the variable CEO’s Variable Remuneration, since it is the part of the remuneration 
that is most linked to the changes in the company’s performance. This variable will be 
computed in the logarithmic form.  
The number of members of the Board of Directors is also an explanatory 
variable in our study,  being split, according to the Portuguese Institute of Corporate 
Governance, between the number of Executive members (the ones whose actively 
perform management functions), the number of Non-independent non-executive 
members (the ones whose do not perform management functions and they are not linked 
to the company) and the number of Independent Non-executive members (the ones that 
are not associated to the company’s interests and does not receive remuneration 
contingent upon the performance of the company). 
There are also four variables that were created to measure the power of the CEOs 
of the sample, such as: the percentage of the capital held by the CEOs, pay slice, tenure 
and duality. 
 The percentage of the capital held by the CEOs of the companies of the sample, 
that is a ratio of the number of shares held over the total of shares of the company; the 
ratio of the percentage of the total compensation paid to the executives of the Board that 
belongs to the CEO (pay slice). Schleifer and Vishny (1997) refer that when a percentage 
of the capital of the company that is held by blockholders achieves 50%, the interests of 
maximization of the value of the company are met, in the way that these can have enough 
power to align the CEO’s interests and the shareholders’ interests.  
CEO tenure is measured by the number of years the CEO has been in that 
position. It may by the case that the board of directors is better able to evaluate the 
leadership of a CEO, the quality of his strategic plans, his ability to identify growth 
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opportunities, and other qualitative aspects of his performance as his tenure increases 
without exclusively relying on corporate financial measures. Alternatively, it is possible 
that the longer the tenure, the more power the CEO exerts over the board (Bushman et 
al., 1996) and the greater the difficulty to replace him. In the light of these results, we 
expect a positive relationship between executive compensation and tenure because in the 
real world, we observe that more experienced CEOs command higher compensation. As 
Hill et al. (2016) used, CEO tenure will be a dummy coded one if the tenure of the CEO 
is greater than the median tenure for all CEOs of the sample and zero otherwise. 
The CEO duality is a dummy variable that equals to one when the CEO also 
holds the position of the Chairman of the board and zero otherwise. 
To analyze the relationship between risk and executive compensation, we used 
the standard deviation of the weekly returns of the companies. We used the standard 
deviation volatility calculated over 2008-2016. Although there is precedence in the 
literature for using variance of returns as a proxy for risk (e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 
1991), no general consensus exists as to the best measure of contracting relevant risk. 
Some authors argue that the general movement of stock prices (i.e., systematic risk) 
represent events not under control of managers. But if a manager is responsible for the 
industries in which the firm invests, then all of this variability may not represent that 
relevant risk. Some also argue that variability of stock returns is an important 
consideration in the design of executive compensation arrangements because it proxies 
for growth opportunities. Smith and Watts (1992) suggest that variability of returns is an 
indicator of a firm’s investment opportunity set with greater variability corresponding to 
greater investment opportunities. 
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4.3. Methodology 
The hypotheses established in the previous section are tested through observations 
of multiple phenomena obtained over multiple time periods for the same firms, that is 
panel data. 
Eq. (1) describes the model used to test the relationship between firm performance 
and variables for compensation structure. 
Firm performance 
= f (CEO’s variable compensation, firm size, percentage of equity held by 
managers, percentage of outside directors, debt leverage) 
Eq. (2) describes the model used to test the relationship between appetite for risk 
and variables for compensation structure and also to test relationship between 
compensation structure and powerfulness of CEOs. 
CEO’s variable compensation 
= f (exposure to risk, firm performance, duality, tenure, pay slice) 
With Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) we will perform a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression analysis, which is a popular two step estimator for instrumental variables 
analysis. 
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4.4. Descriptive Statistics 
In an initial stage of this study, the sample was analyzed in a descriptive way, in 
order to characterize the variables as well as the sample under study – the companies 
listed in Portugal for the period between 2008 and 2016. This analysis will be slip into 
two different time periods: the years from 2008 to 2013 will be considered the period 
during the crisis and 2014 to 2016 will be considered the period after crisis. 
 
Table 2 – Distribution of the Companies of the Sample by Size  
This table shows the division of the companies of the sample according to their size, measured by their total assets. 
 % 
Small 8,11% 
  Nº of Obs. 3 
Medium 72,97% 
  Nº of Obs. 27 
Large 18,92% 
  Nº of Obs. 7 
Total 100,00% 
  Nº of Obs. 37 
 
According to the Table 2, we can conclude that the sample is mainly composed 
of large and medium-sized companies, according to the definition adopted by the 
European Commission10. Thus, around 73% of the companies of the sample are 
considered medium-sized and, roughly 19% of the companies are considered large-sized.  
  
                                               
10 The European Commission’s recommendation of 6 May 2003 assumes that: large-sized 
companies are composed by 250 or more employees, the turnover is over €50 million and the net assets and 
the net assets exceeds €43 million; the medium-sized companies are composed by fewer than 250 
employees, the turnover does not exceed €50 million or the total annual balance does not exceed €43 
million; and finally, small-sized companies are composed by less than 50 employees and the turnover or 
total balance sheet does not exceed €10 million. 
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Table 3 – Distribution of the Companies of the Sample by their Activity Sector 
This table shows the division of the companies of the sample according to their activity sector. 
Sector % Nº Obs 
Industrials 32,43% 12 
Consumer Services 29,73% 11 
Basic Materials 2,70% 1 
Technology 10,81% 4 
Consumer Goods 5,41% 2 
Utilities 10,81% 4 
Telecommunications 8,11% 3 
    Total 100% 37 
 
Table 3 allows to know the sample more deeply. Thus, we can conclude that 
around 32% of the companies of the sample belong to the Industrials sector and almost 
30% of the companies of the sample belong to the Consumer Services sector. The sector 
with the lowest weight is the Basic Materials sector (2,70% of the companies of the 
sample), followed by the Consumer Goods sector (5,41% of the companies of the 
sample). 
Table 4 - Descriptive Statistics for the Performance of the Companies 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the performance of the companies of the sample, 
measured by the Return on Assets (ROA), that is the ratio of EBIT to the book value of the firm’s total assets. This 
analysis is split into two different time periods: from 2008 to 2013 is considered the period during crisis and from 2014 
to 2016 is considered the period after crisis. 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Crisis Period (2008 
– 2013) 
4,05% 4,26% -46,44% 36,47% 
Post-Crisis Period 
(2014 – 2016) 
3,82% 2,69% -29,85% 35,86% 
Total 3,97% 4,25% -46,44% 36,47% 
 
From Erro! A origem da referência não foi encontrada. we can conclude that 
the performance of the companies of the sample, calculated by ROA, had a decrease in 
its value, in the last period of the study, which can be clearly explained by the presence 
of the financial crisis in the country, in the previous period. The economic and financial 
crisis that began in 2008 had a great repercussion in Portugal, affecting companies and 
global economy. And, according to these results, we can observe a possible gap between 
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the exact moment of the international crisis and the moment when its effects marked the 
Portuguese economy. 
Table 5 - Descriptive Statistics for the Board of Directors Composition 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the number of Board of Directors, as well as, the Board’s 
composition between executives, non-executives and independent non-executives members and the existence of a 
Remuneration Committee. 
 Total Executives 
Non Executives 
Remuneration Committee Non - 
Independent 
Independent 
Mean 9,25 4,07 3,25 1,93 2,63 
Minimum 3 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 25 9 8 10 4 
 
According to the Table 5, we can observe that, for a total 37 Portuguese 
companies, the mean of non-executive members is superior to the mean of executive 
members per Board of Directors. A typical Board of Directors has, in average, four 
executive members, five non-executive members, where two of them are independent 
from the company. It is also common, the existence of a Remuneration Committee 
composed, on average, by three members. Another interesting factor is that 19% of the 
companies of the sample do not have any non-executive members on their Board of 
Directors, which could be explained by the fact that the majority of the companies follow 
the model Supervisory Board + Executive Committee. 
 
Table 6 – Descriptive Statistics for the Composition of the Board of Directors 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the number of the members of the Board of Directors, as well 
as for its composition of executives, non-executives and independent members and the existence of a Remuneration 
Committee. The analysis is split into two different time periods: from 2008 to 2013 is considered the period during 
crisis and from 2014 to 2016 is considered the period after crisis. 
   
Total Executives 
Non 
Executives 
Independents 
Remuneration 
Committee 
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Mean 9,40 4,29 5,12 1,80 2,60 
Minimum 3 1 0 0 0 
Maximum 25 9 18 10 4 
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) 
Mean 8,93 3,67 5,26 2,24 2,69 
Minimum 3 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 20 8 18 10 3 
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According to Table 6, we can conclude that the Board of Directors of a company 
in our sample can have a maximum of 25 members and a minimum of 3. In all of the 
studied years, on average, the number of non-executive members is always greater than 
the number of executive members of a Board of Directors, which is very common in most 
listed firms in developed markets (Bebchuk et al., 2010). There is no clear trend over the 
years, regarding the composition of the Board of Directors of the Portuguese companies, 
which could mean that there is a continuous concern to try to improve and achieve an 
ideal structure. 
 
Table 7 – Descriptive Statistics for the Total Remuneration (in €) of the CEO of a company 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the Total Remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
of a company, in Euros (€). The analysis is split into two different time periods: from 2008 to 2013 this is considered 
to be the crisis period and from 2014 to 2016 this is considered to be the after-crisis 
 
  
Number of 
Observations 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Crisis Period 
(2008 – 2013) 
209 505078,78 357921,17 21199,00 2525093,00 
Post-Crisis 
Period (2014 – 
2016) 
109 459628,27 355917,00 0 2039211,00 
TOTAL 318 489928,61 355917,00 0 2525093,00 
 
Analyzing the Table 7, it is possible to see that, in average, a CEO of a listed 
company, in Portugal, can earn approximately 489.928 Euros, per year.  
The mean of Total Remuneration of a CEO reveals a downward trend in recent 
years since the last financial crisis (2008-2013). It is interesting that it is exactly in those 
years of crisis that the CEOs in Portugal seem to earn the most, which could be explained 
because of the gap between pay and lagged performance measures. 
Since the Total Remuneration presents such a wide range of values, fluctuating 
between a minimum of 0 Euros11 and a maximum of 2.525.093 Euros, it makes sense to 
                                               
11 This extreme value is possible as there one company in the sample, Imobiliária Construtora Grão-Pára, that, due to the 
company’s economic and financial situation, it was decided to suspend the payment of the remuneration of their executives, since 
2013 until the final date of this study. 
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analyze the median of the sample, since that it is not skewed so much by extremely large 
or small values, and so it may give a better idea of a “typical” value. 
 
Figure 5 – CEO’s Total Remuneration (in €) 
This figure shows the Total Remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a company, according to the median 
values. 
 
Given this and analyzing the Figure 5, composed by the median values, we can 
observe a noticeable increase of the remunerations in 2014, which could suggest an 
attempt of improving market conditions driven by macroeconomic developments, but it 
was followed by a decrease of the same ones in the following years.  
 
Table 8 – Descriptive Statistics for the Fixed Remuneration (in €) of the CEO of a company 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the Fixed Remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
of a company, in Euros (€). The analysis is split into two different time periods: from 2008 to 2013 this is considered 
to be the crisis period and from 2014 to 2016 this is considered to be the after-crisis period. 
  
Number of 
Observations 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Crisis Period 
(2008 – 2013) 
209 327209,09 280343,96 0,00 1069600,00 
Post-Crisis 
Period (2014 – 
2016) 
109 311069,24 279750,00 0,00 1069600,00 
TOTAL 318 321829,14 280000,00 0,00 1069600,00 
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Figure 6 – CEO’s Median Fixed Remuneration (in €) 
This figure shows the Fixed Remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a company, according to 
the median values. 
 
 
Table 9 - Descriptive Statistics for the Variable Remuneration (in €) of the CEO of a company 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the Variable Remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) of a company, in Euros (€). The analysis is split into two different time periods: from 2008 to 2013 this is 
considered to be the crisis period and from 2014 to 2016 this is considered to be the after-crisis period. 
  
Number of 
Observations 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Crisis Period 
(2008 – 2013) 
209 177869,69 48340,77 0,00 1813507,00 
Post-Crisis 
Period (2014 – 
2016) 
109 148559,04 2500,00 0,00 1578511,00 
TOTAL 318 168099,47 46440,62 0,00 1813507,00 
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Figure 7 – CEO’s Variable Remuneration (in €) 
This figure shows the Variable Remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a company, according 
to the median values. 
 
When analyzing the Remuneration of CEOs, it is observable that the fixed 
component of remuneration (Table 8) has a greater weight than the variable component 
of remuneration (Table 9). Therefore, 66% of the Total Remuneration earned by the 
CEOs is fixed, while only 34% is variable. Examining the median values, the fixed 
component acquires an even higher weight on the Total Remuneration. 
On average, each CEO earn, annually, approximately 321.829 Euros of Fixed 
Remuneration and approximately 168.099 Euros of Variable Remuneration. 
According to the Figure 6, it is possible to observe that the fixed part of the 
remuneration presents an increase from 2009 onwards, always showing higher values 
than those presented in 2008 and 2009. This appreciation of the Fixed Remuneration may 
explain a possible protection post-crisis of the CEOs to the changes of the performance 
of the company since the remuneration oscillates according to the changes in the 
productivity and performance of the company. Given this and analyzing the Figure 7, as 
expected, it shows a fall in the value of the Variable Remuneration from 2009 to 2011, 
presenting an increase in the years of 2012 and 213, and returning to a downward trend 
to the present day. 
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Table 10 – Descriptive Statistics for Percentage of Variable Remuneration of the CEO 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the percentage of variable remuneration of the CEO. The 
analysis is split into two different time periods: The analysis is split into two different time periods: from 2008 to 2013 
this is considered to be the crisis period and from 2014 to 2016 this is considered to be the after-crisis period. 
  Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Crisis Period 
(2008 – 2013) 22,86% 17,81% 0,00% 100,00% 
Post-Crisis 
Period (2014 
– 2016) 
19,11% 0,80% 0,00% 77,41% 
TOTAL 21,61% 14,04% 0,00% 100,00% 
 
Figure 8 - Percentage of Variable Remuneration of the CEO 
This figure shows the Percentage of Variable Remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a 
company, according to the median values. 
 
 
According to Table 10, we can observe the mean value of the percentage of 
variable remuneration over total compensation, that a CEO usually receives is, 
approximately, 22%. 
The variable remuneration is the set of different forms of reward offered to 
employees, complementing fixed remuneration and liking factors such as attitudes, 
performance and others with perceived value. The remuneration according to the results 
of the company (usually referred as “pay-for-performace” (Core and Guay, 2010)) and 
the share ownership are two forms of variable remuneration and they are linked to 
performance. Individual performance can be rewarded by a rewards system, and team 
performance can be recognized through performance pay. 
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The “pay-for performance” strategy is far from being the optimal solution to the 
problems of low performance in the companies, however it facilitates the alignment of 
the interests of the employees to the interests of the company, resulting in an agreement 
that will favor the generation of positive and sustainable results over time (Murphy, 1985 
and Core and Guay, 2010). 
Table 11 -Descriptive Statistics for the CEO’s pay slice 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the percentage of the total compensation paid to the CEO over 
the total compensation paid to the executives of the Board. The analysis is split into two different time periods: from 
2008 to 2013 this is considered to be the crisis period and from 2014 to 2016 this is considered to be the after-crisis 
period. 
  Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Crisis Period 
(2008 – 2013) 35,33% 31,36% 0,54% 86,58% 
Post-Crisis 
Period (2014 – 
2016) 
33,33% 27,85% 0,00% 100,00% 
TOTAL 34,67% 30,64% 0,00% 100,00% 
 
 
Figure 9 – The CEO’s Pay Slice 
This figure shows the CEO’s Pay Slice, according to the median values. 
 
According to the values of the Table 11, we can infer that around 30% of the total 
compensation paid to the executives of a Board of Directors of a company goes to the 
Chief Executive Officer. 
In relation to the extreme values in the second period of the study, the 0% 
(minimum of 2014, 2015 and 2016, see Appendix, Table 31) in the table is explained by 
those companies of the sample that decided to suspend the payment of the remuneration 
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to their executives and the 100% (maximum of 2016, see Appendix, Table 31) is 
explained by a company that is composed by only one executive member in its Board. 
Through the Figure 9, it is possible to observe that in the years following the 
crisis, the CEO lost some power among the Board of Directors, which is in line with lower 
remunerations in those years. In this way, the percentage of the remuneration of the Board 
of Directors that goes to the CEO became more diluted with the remuneration of the 
remaining executives.  
It is also noticeable that in recent years, the CEO is again acquiring the power lost 
in previous years. 
 
Table 12 – Descriptive Statistics for the Proportion of Capital of the company held by the CEO 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the percentage of the number of shares held by the CEO of a 
company. The analysis is split into two different time periods: from 2008 to 2013 this is considered to be the crisis 
period and from 2014 to 2016 this is considered to be the after-crisis period. 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Crisis Period (2008 
– 2013) 
4,28% 0,04% 0,00% 79,39% 
Post-Crisis Period 
(2014 – 2016) 
4,32% 0,00% 0,00% 77,50% 
TOTAL 4,29% 0,01% 0,00% 79,39% 
 
On average, the share ownership held by the top executive manager of a company 
is around 4,3%. It is important to mention that, since 2008, the percentage of shares of a 
company held by the CEO increased slightly, having its peak value during the financial 
crisis (2011-2012) and then decreasing a little bit, remaining constant throughout some 
years. Recently, in 2016, we are seeing this percentage increasing once again. 
 
Table 13 – Descriptive Statistics for the Tenure of the CEO 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the number of years that a CEO remains in his job. The analysis 
is split into two different time periods: from 2008 to 2013 this is considered to be the crisis period and from 2014 to 
2016 this is considered to be the after-crisis period. 
  Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Crisis Period 
(2008 – 2013) 7,13 4 0 50 
Post-Crisis 
Period (2014 – 
2016) 
6,69 5 0 26 
TOTAL 7,04 5 0 50 
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From Table 13, on average, we can observe that a CEO remains in that position 
for at least seven years. These results are associated with the tendency for the existence 
of family companies in Portugal. Family groups tended to manage the succession process 
of executives quite actively and are usually able to provide renewal by offering 
opportunities to retiring/replaced executives either in other parts of the group or via new 
business initiatives. 
 
Table 14 – Descriptive Statistics for the Duality of the CEO 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the duality of a CEO. The analysis is split into two different 
time periods: from 2008 to 2013 this is considered to be the crisis period and from 2014 to 2016 this is considered to 
be the after-crisis period. 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Crisis Period (2008 
– 2013) 0,50 0 0 1 
Post-Crisis Period 
(2014 – 2016) 0,50 0 0 1 
TOTAL 0,50 0 0 1 
 
From the Table 14, we can observe that, on average, a Portuguese company has 
in charge a CEO that is, at the same time, the Chairman of the Board. Establishing a unity 
of command at the head of the firm allows the firm to send a reassuring message to 
shareholders. However, it is also easier for the CEO to assert control of the board and 
consequently make it more difficult for shareholders to monitor and discipline the 
management (Core et al., 1999). 
 
Table 15 – Descriptive Statistics for the Standard Deviation of Weekly Returns 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the standard deviation of weekly returns of the companies. We 
used the natural logarithm of the standard deviation volatility calculated over 2008-2016. The analysis is split into two 
different time periods: from 2008 to 2013 this is considered to be the crisis period and from 2014 to 2016 this is 
considered to be the after-crisis period. 
  Nº Obs Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Crisis Period 
(2008 – 2013) 203 0,171 0,050 0,014 13,142 
Post-Crisis 
Period (2014 
– 2016) 
108 0,084 0,053 0,017 1,409 
TOTAL 311 0,142 0,050 0,014 13,142 
 
The standard deviation is used as an indicator of market volatility and therefore 
of risk. The larger the variance and standard deviation, the more volatile the company 
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stocks and the greater the risk. This type of measuring risk is been used by several authors 
among the literature, such as, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Sigler (2011). 
According to the Table 15, we can observe that the period during crisis presents a higher 
standard deviation value, as would be expected. 
Table 16 - Descriptive Statistics for the Debt Ratio 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the Debt Ratio of the companies. This ratio was computed as 
the sum of long-term and short-term debt over total assets. The analysis is split into two different time periods: from 
2008 to 2013 this is considered to be the crisis period and from 2014 to 2016 this is considered to be the after-crisis 
period. 
   Nº Obs Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Crisis Period 
(2008 – 2013) 221 23,63% 23,68% 0,00% 90,71% 
Post-Crisis 
Period (2014 
– 2016) 
106 22,00% 16,52% 0,00% 76,39% 
TOTAL 327 23,09% 23,26% 0,00% 90,71% 
 
The higher this ratio, the more leveraged a company is, implying greater financial 
risk (Titman et al., 1988). However, leverage is an important tool that companies use to 
grow. It is also important to mention that debt ratios vary widely across industries, with 
capital-intensive businesses, such as utilities, having much higher debt ratios than other 
industries, such as the technology sector.  
We can observe from the Table 16 that this ratio is higher during the financial 
crisis than it is after the financial crisis. This difference is much bigger when talking about 
the median values.  
Table 17 – Descriptive Statistics for the Intangible Assets to Total Assets Ratio 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the Intangible Assets to Total Assets Ratio of the companies. 
The analysis is split into two different time periods: from 2008 to 2013 this is considered to be the crisis period and 
from 2014 to 2016 this is considered to be the after-crisis period. 
  Nº Obs Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Crisis Period 
(2008 – 2013) 221 20,90% 13,00% 0,00% 87,00% 
Post-Crisis 
Period (2014 
– 2016) 
106 14,96% 3,66% 0,00% 98,72% 
TOTAL 327 18,92% 12,07% 0,00% 98,72% 
 
The smaller this ratio the larger the portion of a firm’s total assets is comprised of 
tangible assets, or material items the company can sell for monetary value. This ratio 
varies from industry to industry, so the definition of a “high” or “low” ratio should be 
made within the context. It is clear to conclude that this ratio is higher during the financial 
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crisis than it is in the post-crisis period. This decrease suggests that the companies of the 
sample have either written down some intangible assets or increased its tangible assets. 
4.4.1. Correlation between Variables 
Following the procedures of a statistical analysis, it was intended to ascertain the 
relationship between the different variables of the study, in order to measure the 
dependence/independence of the variables. 
Table 18 – Correlation between Variables of the 1st Equation 
This table shows the correlation between the variables of the first equation of the system. 
TComp is the absolute value of the Total Remuneration of the CEO; VComp is the absolute value of the Variables Remuneration 
of the CEO; RemVar is the percentage of the Variable Remuneration of the CEO; ROA is the Return On Assets ratio that measures the 
performance of the company; Risk is the variance of the weekly returns; Duality is a dummy variable that equals to one when the CEO also 
holds the position of the Chairman of the board and zero otherwise; Tenure is the number of years that a CEO remains in his job; Payslice is 
the percentage of the total compensation paid to the executives of the Board that belongs to the CEO; TotAss is the absolute value of the Total 
Assets of the company; EqHeld is the percentage of the number of shares held by the CEO of a company; IndMembers is the number of 
Independent Members of the company; and, DebtRatio is the Debt Ratio of the companies. 
 TComp VComp RemVar ROA Risk Duality Tenure PaySlice TotAss EqHeld IndMembers DebtRatio 
TComp 1,000            
VComp 0,860 1,000           
RemVar 0,539 0,749 1,000          
ROA 0,087 0,017 -0,005 1,000         
Risk -0,096 -0,055 -0,003 -0,056 1,000        
Duality -0,295 -0,230 -0,172 0,010 0,100 1,000       
Tenure 0,020 0,095 0,090 -0,045 0,259 0,195 1,000      
PaySlice 0,046 0,089 0,200 -0,049 0,116 0,009 0,233 1,000     
TotAss 0,132 0,186 0,117 0,025 -0,032 -0,023 -0,035 -0,105 1,000    
EqHeld -0,160 -0,105 0,106 -0,020 0,088 0,308 0,189 0,319 -0,095 1,000   
IndMembers 0,182 0,239 0,266 0,155 -0,021 -0,274 -0,111 0,250 0,143 0,167 1,000  
DebtRatio -0,087 -0,089 -0,129 -0,132 -0,077 -0,013 -0,096 -0,216 0,207 -0,204 0,009 1,000 
 
Table 19 – Correlation of the Variables of the 2nd Equation 
This table shows the correlation between the variables of the second equation of the system. 
TComp is the absolute value of the Total Remuneration of the CEO; VComp is the absolute value of the Variable Remuneration 
of the CEO; RemVar is the percentage of the Variable Remuneration of the CEO; ROA is the Return On Assets ratio that measures the 
performance of the company; Risk is the variance of the weekly returns; Duality is a dummy variable that equals to one when the CEO also 
holds the position of the Chairman of the board and zero otherwise; Tenure is the number of years that a CEO remains in his job; Payslice is 
the percentage of the total compensation paid to the executives of the Board that belongs to the CEO; TotAss is the absolute value of the Total 
Assets of the company; EqHeld is the percentage of the number of shares held by the CEO of a company; IndMembers is the number of 
Independent Members of the company; and, IATA is the Intangible Assets to Total Assets Ratio of the companies. 
 TComp VComp RemVar ROA Risk Duality Tenure PaySlice TotAss EqHeld IndMembers IATA 
TComp 1,000            
VComp 0,860 1,000           
RemVar 0,539 0,749 1,000          
ROA 0,087 0,017 -0,005 1,000         
Risk -0,096 -0,055 -0,003 -0,056 1,000        
Duality -0,295 -0,230 -0,172 0,010 0,100 1,000       
Tenure 0,020 0,095 0,090 -0,045 0,259 0,195 1,000      
PaySlice 0,046 0,089 0,200 -0,049 0,116 0,009 0,233 1,000     
TotAss 0,132 0,186 0,117 0,025 -0,032 -0,023 -0,035 -0,105 1,000    
EqHeld -0,160 -0,105 0,106 -0,020 0,088 0,308 0,189 0,319 -0,095 1,000   
IndMembers 0,182 0,239 0,266 0,155 -0,021 -0,274 -0,111 0,250 0,143 0,167 1,000  
IATA -0,117 -0,167 -0,212 0,087 -0,050 -0,166 -0,010 -0,148 0,098 -0,190 -0,109 1,000 
The Impact of the CEO’s Remuneration on Firm Performance during the 2011/2012 Financial Crisis – The Portuguese Case 
MASTER IN FINANCE 
 
40 
According to the analysis of the Table 18 and the Table 19, there is a positive 
correlation between the percentage of the Variable Remuneration, the absolute value of 
the Total Remuneration and the absolute value of the Variable Remuneration (54% and 
75%, respectively). Since these three variables are highly correlated, they are associated 
so we decided to run the regression in three different ways: (1) the dependent variables 
will be Percentage of the Variable Remuneration (RemVar) and Performance of the 
company (ROA), (2) the dependent variables will be the natural logarithm of absolute 
value of the Total Remuneration (LOGTCOMP) and Performance of the company 
(ROA), and (3) the dependent variables will be the natural logarithm of the absolute value 
of the Variable Remuneration (LOGVCOMP) and the Performance of the company 
(ROA). 
Excluding the IATA and DebtRatio variables, all the other independent variables 
are common to the two equations of the system. 
The company’s performance can be evaluated by the Return-on-Assets ratio 
(ROA), which is positively related to the Total Remuneration (9%) and to the Variable 
Remuneration (2%). However, since the reward of the good performance is visible in the 
variable remuneration of the executive directors, this result allows us to foresee that, 
eventually, the remuneration will not be determined according to the performance of the 
company, since the ROA is more correlated with the Total Remuneration variable rather 
than the Variable Remuneration variable. 
The obtained results, although preliminary, allowed to foresee some of the 
possible results obtained from the linear regressions. However, although it is still not 
possible to conclude from the analysis of correlation matrices, the knowledge of the 
behavior of the variables may be useful in later analyzes. 
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5.  Regression Analysis 
5.1. The 2SLS Regression 
Under the 2SLS regression approach, and in the light of the studies conducted by 
Gao and Li (2015), in the first stage we run a linear probability regression to the CEO’s 
compensation of a company, which is the Variable Compensation indicator variable 
(LOGVCOMP). 
 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑉𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃(,* = 	𝛽. +	𝛽0	𝑅𝑂𝐴(,* + 	𝛽3	𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(,* + 	𝛽7	𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(,*+ 	𝛽>	𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒(,* + 	𝛽C	𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑆𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒(,* + 𝛽F	𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆(,*+ 𝛽H	𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑑(,* + 	𝛽L	𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠(,*+ 𝛽Q	𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜(,* + 	𝜇 
 
(1) 
Where the variable LOGVCOMP (the natural logarithm of the absolute value of 
the Variable Remuneration) will be replaced for other variables, such as: LOGTCOMP 
(the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the Total Remuneration), REMVAR (the 
percentage of the Variable Remuneration) and PaySlice (the percentage of the total 
compensation paid to the executives of the Board that belongs to the CEO), in order to 
understand the changes that the use of these variables as dependent variables could bring 
to the final results. 
The Debt Ratio is a financial ratio that measures the extent of a company’s 
leverage. We used the sum of long-term and short-term debt to the total assets, all data 
extracted from the financial data of the reports of each company of the sample. This 
variable is used with the purpose of having a variable that does not influence the ROA 
but that can influence the compensation, since a more leveraged firm will have more 
financial restrictions, becoming more difficult to pay higher remunerations to its 
managers (Titman et al., 1988). 
 In the second stage, we use the predicted CEO’s variable compensation as the 
independent variable and examine how it influences the firm performance. For the 
purpose of identification, we need an instrumental variable (IV) that affects the CEO’s 
variable compensation but does not affect the firm performance directly. 
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 𝑅𝑂𝐴(,* = 	 𝛾. +	𝛾0𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑉𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃(,* + 	𝛾3	𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(,* + 	𝛾7𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(,*+ 	𝛾>𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒(,* + 	𝛾C𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑆𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒(,* + 	𝛾F	𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆(,*+ 	𝛾H	𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑑(,* + 	𝛾L	𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠(,*+ 𝛾Q𝐼𝐴𝑇𝐴(,* + 	𝜗 
 
(2) 
The IV used in the second equation is the intangible assets to total assets ratio 
(IATA). The Intangible Assets to Total Assets Ratio (IATA Ratio) is a ratio that 
measures how much goodwill (intangible assets) a company is recording compared to the 
total level of its assets. 
This chapter of the study will analyze the determinants of the compensation of the 
Chief Executive Officer and the impact that they could have on the performance of the 
company.  
This analysis will be controlled with a time dummy (CrisisD) and sector dummies. 
5.1.1.  Remuneration and Performance  
In order to analyze the relationship between the remuneration of the CEO and 
performance of the company, we move forward with a 2SLS regression with the two 
equations listed earlier. 
Table 20 – The Complete Model 
This table shows the results of the impact of the Remuneration of the CEO on the Performance of the company on Panel A and the 
impact Perfomance of the company on the Remuneration of the CEO on Panel B. 
LOGTCOMP is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the Total Remuneration of the CEO; LOGVCOMP is the natural 
logarithm of the absolute value of the Variable Remuneration of the CEO; RemVar is the percentage of the Variable Remuneration of the 
CEO; ROA is the Return On Assets ratio that measures the performance of the company; Risk is the variance of the weekly returns; Duality is 
a dummy variable that equals to one when the CEO also holds the position of the Chairman of the board and zero otherwise; Tenure is the 
number of years that a CEO remains in his job; Payslice is the percentage of the total compensation paid to the executives of the Board that 
belongs to the CEO; LOGAss is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the Total Assets of the company; EqHeld is the percentage of 
the number of shares held by the CEO of a company; IndMembers is the number of Independent Members of the company; IATA is the 
Intangible Assets to Total Assets Ratio of the companies; DebtRatio is the Debt Ratio of the companies;  
*significant coefficient for a level of significance of 10% 
** significant coefficient for a level of significance of 5% 
*** significant coefficient for a level of significance of 1% 
Panel A: Results of the Equation (1)  
Equation (1) 
 LOGVCOMP LOGTCOMP RemVar PaySlice 
Constant 6,533*** 
(0,000) 
6,022*** 
(0,000) 
57,521*** 
(0,000) 
22,139** 
(0,045) 
ROA 
 
0,017 
(0,606) 
0,051*** 
(0,007) 
0,599 
(0,551) 
-1,762** 
(0,032) 
Risk -0,047 -0,032 -0,694 -0,016 
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 (0,352) (0,376) (0,694) (0,990) 
Duality -0,015 
(0,919) 
-0,231*** 
(0,002) 
-7,766** 
(0,030) 
0,966 
(0,740) 
Tenure 0,013** 
(0,050) 
0,005 
(0,165) 
0,419** 
(0,026) 
0,409*** 
(0,007) 
LOGAss -0,192*** 
(0,000) 
-0,082*** 
(0,000) 
-5,080*** 
(0,002) 
2,136* 
(0,099) 
EqHeld -0,009*** 
(0,010) 
-0,002 
(0,400) 
0,092 
(0,469) 
0,206* 
(0,072) 
IndMembers 0,378 
(0,231) 
0,119 
(0,549) 
25,179*** 
(0,015) 
29,751*** 
(0,003) 
DebtRatio 0,061 
(0,853) 
0,298 
(0,150) 
-3,029 
(0,770) 
-29,163*** 
(0,003) 
Adj R2 0,093 -0,608 0,079 -0,207 
 
Panel B: Results of the Equation (2) 
Equation (2) 
 ROA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0,892 
(0,941) 
-14,793 
(0,312) 
3,607 
(0,452) 
5,816 
(0,185) 
LOGVCOMP 0,937 
(0,582) 
   
LOGTCOMP  3,522 
(0,116) 
  
RemVar   0,065 
(0,150) 
 
PaySlice    0,108 
(0,345) 
Risk -0,177 
(0,760) 
-0,200 
(0,710) 
-0,361 
(0,452) 
-0,549 
(0,324) 
Duality 3,303* 
(0,011) 
2,427*** 
(0,021) 
2,458** 
(0,025) 
2,993** 
(0,033) 
Tenure -0,056 
(0,467) 
-0,041 
(0,484) 
-0,046 
(0,464) 
-0,069 
(0,396) 
LOGAss -0,533 
(0,372) 
-0,434 
(0,403) 
-0,485 
(0,364) 
-0,998* 
(0,066) 
EqHeld -0,046 
(0,255) 
-0,016 
(0,666) 
-0,046 
(0,187) 
-0,081 
(0,128) 
IndMembers 6,352** 
(0,024) 
5,792** 
(0,021) 
6,228*** 
(0,017) 
6,224** 
(0,036) 
IATA 3,571 
(0,178) 
4,103** 
(0,028) 
5,235*** 
(0,011) 
4,913** 
(0,021) 
Adj. R2 0,019 0,033 -0,019 -0,047 
 
 According to the values of the Table 20, it is possible to conclude that only two 
of four regressions performed have consistency in R2. In the results of Equation (1), Panel 
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A, only when we consider the Variable Compensation (LOGVCOMP) and the percentage 
of Variable Remuneration (RemVar) as dependent variables, we have the explained 
proportion of variation of the model positive, although low, presenting results of 
approximately 9% and 8%, respectively. Regarding the results of Equation (2), Panel B, 
R2 is only positive when considering the Variable Compensation (LOGVCOMP) and 
Total Compensation (LOGTCOMP), presenting results of approximately 1% and 3%, 
respectively. 
Regarding the performance of the company, measured by ROA, we can observe 
that it presents a positive coefficient in three regressions, being only significant, at a 
significance level of 1%, when we consider the Total Compensation (LOGTCOMP) as 
dependent variable (coefficient of 0,051 - Table 20 – Panel A). These results lead us to 
conclude that Portuguese companies are compensating their CEOs according to their 
performance levels, since remunerations increase as when performance increases. These 
results are in agreement with several authors that rely on this type field, such as Rayton 
(2003) and Core and Guay (2010), for example. When we consider the CEO Pay Slice 
(PaySlice) we achieved a negative coefficient (coefficient of -1,762 - Table 20 – Panel 
A), which leads us to conclude that everytime that the percentage of CEO remuneration 
increases in comparison with the total compensation paid to the executives of the Board 
of the company, the performance of the company tends to decrease, being related with 
agency problems. This result is in agreement with the study made by Bebchuk et al. 
(2011), that also find a negative correlation between the CEO Pay Slice and firm 
performance, which could be explained, for example, by an agency problem explanation, 
where high excess CEO Pay Slice could reflect agency and governance problems. 
Risk is also one of the variables under study in this report. In three of four 
regressions made in this report, this variable has a negative coefficient. These results lead 
us to conclude that whenever the CEO’s compensation increases, the risk of the company 
tends to decrease. The literature, such as Francis et al. (2015) and DeYoung et al. (2013) 
argue that when compensation plans are linked to the performance levels (Pay-for-
Performance), CEOs are more willing to integrate riskier projects, which could bring 
better results to the company’s performance. However, the results of this study do not 
find the same. One of the possible explanations is that CEOs want to protect their high 
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position and remuneration, and as they are decision-makers and risk could bring them 
instability, they choose to avoid risky situations. 
With respect to the variable Tenure, it is presented positive coefficients, which 
means that the CEO’s remuneration increases, as he stays longer in the same position. 
These results are in accordance with the Managerial Power approach, presented, for 
example, by Core et al. (1999). 
Regarding the size of the company, measured by the Total Assets (LOGAss) and 
the analysis of the obtained results, it is concluded that only the CEO’s Pay Slice 
(PaySlice) dependent variable is in line with what is said in the literature: as the size of 
the company increases, the percentage of total remuneration paid to the CEO increases. 
All the other dependent variables contradict what is said, for example, by Gabaix and 
Landier (2008), Murphy (1985), Baumol (1959) and Marris (1963), presenting a negative 
coefficient at a significance level of 1%, which indicates that as the company size 
decreases, the CEO remuneration increases. This can also be a sign of agency problems, 
since the smaller the company, the more power the CEO has, and he can earn a higher 
salary. 
The variable that represents the Equity Held by the CEO (EqHeld) shows a 
negative coefficient on the first two regressions of the Table 20 and a positive coefficient 
in the third and fourth regressions, presenting significance at a level of 1% when we 
consider the Variable Compensation (LOGVCOMP) as dependent variable (coefficient 
of -0,009 - Table 20 – Panel A). The negative coefficient of the variable means that lower 
percentage of shares held by the CEO, the greater his/her remuneration.  This correlation 
can be explained by the fact that this variable may be a type of compensation that is non-
cash remuneration that translates into ownership in the firm (Mehran, 1995), so the more 
stock the CEOs have, the lower their cash compensation will be. 
The variable that represents the number of independent members of the company 
(IndMembers) presents a positive coefficient in all four regressions made and significance 
in almost all of them. These results mean that the more independent members are on the 
Board of Directors of a company, the higher the CEO’s compensation. 
Although the results from the Table 20 – Panel B, we can take some conclusions 
by the presented values. From the four regressions presented, it is when we use the Total 
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Compensation (LOGTCOMP) as independent variable (without being an instrumental 
variable) that we have a higher level of R2. 
Taking into account the relationship between pay and performance, we can 
conclude from the results that there is a positive relationship. These results are in 
accordance with the Panel A and with the Arm’s Length approach (Duffhues & Kabir, 
2008), which leads us to conclude that the executive compensation has been designed by 
the Board with proper incentives to create value to the shareholders and to the firm. 
In the Risk side, it is presented a negative relationship between this variable and 
the performance of the firm (ROA), which means that a firm that engage in risky 
situations, it is not the firm that presents the better results in the end of the year. This is 
confirmed by Sigler (2011) when they say that this is related with agency problems. 
Sometimes managers are induced in engage in activities that produce problems for firms 
and, thus, creating agency problems; and firms with greater agency problems perform 
worse (Core et al., 1999). 
As Bebchuk et al. (2011) concluded and in accordance with the results of the Panel 
A, in Panel B, we can see a negative correlation between the pay slice and firm 
performance, which could reflect agency and governance problems. 
Analyzing the results from the Table 20 – Panel B, it is possible to conclude that 
there is a significant relationship between firm performance (ROA) and the board 
composition (IndMembers). Since we achieved positive coefficients in this relationship, 
we can conclude that a higher number of independent members in the composition of the 
Board of a company brings a higher level of performance measured by ROA. The 
independents members act as mediators on the relationship between management and 
shareholders and they try to fulfill the information gap between the shareholders and 
executive managers, contributing for the resolution of agency problems. These 
conclusions are in accordance with what was said in the study of Mehran (1995) but 
contradicts his results, since he found no significant relationship between firm 
performance and board composition. 
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To the regression of the equations (1) and (2), it was introduced the variables 
related to activity sector and the moment of the financial crisis, in order to control the 
influence of the activity sector and the crisis on the problem of this study. 
 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑉𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃(,* = 	𝛽. +	𝛽0	𝑅𝑂𝐴(,* + 	𝛽3	𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(,* + 	𝛽7	𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(,*+ 	𝛽>	𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒(,* + 	𝛽C	𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆(,* + 𝛽F	𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑑(,*+ 	𝛽H	𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠(,* + 𝛽L	𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜(,*+ 𝛽Q,…,0F	𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟(,* + 𝛽0H	𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝐷(,* + 	𝜇 
 
(3) 
 𝑅𝑂𝐴(,* = 	 𝛾. +	𝛾0𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑉𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃(,* + 	𝛾3	𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(,* + 	𝛾7𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(,*+ 	𝛾>𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒(,* +	𝛾C	𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆(,*+ 	𝛾F	𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑑(,* + 	𝛾H	𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠(,*+ 𝛾L𝐼𝐴𝑇𝐴(,* + 𝛾Q,…,0F	𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟(,* + 𝛾0H	𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝐷(,*+ 	𝜗 
 
(4) 
 
 
Table 21 – The Complete Model – The Impact of the Crisis and the Activity Sector 
This table shows the results of the impact of the Remuneration of the CEO on the Performance of the company on Panel A and the 
impact Perfomance of the company on the Remuneration of the CEO on Panel B. 
LOGTCOMP is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the Total Remuneration of the CEO; LOGVCOMP is the natural 
logarithm of the absolute value of the Variable Remuneration of the CEO; RemVar is the percentage of the Variable Remuneration of the 
CEO; ROA is the Return On Assets ratio that measures the performance of the company; Risk is the variance of the weekly returns; Duality is 
a dummy variable that equals to one when the CEO also holds the position of the Chairman of the board and zero otherwise; Tenure is the 
number of years that a CEO remains in his job; Payslice is the percentage of the total compensation paid to the executives of the Board that 
belongs to the CEO; LOGAss is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the Total Assets of the company; EqHeld is the percentage of 
the number of shares held by the CEO of a company; IndMembers is the number of Independent Members of the company; IATA is the 
Intangible Assets to Total Assets Ratio of the companies; and, DebtRatio is the Debt Ratio of the companies, CrisisD is the dummy variable 
of the moment of the crisis; ConsGoods means the companies that belong to the Consumer Goods Actitvity Sector; Utili means the companies 
that belong to the Utilities Activity Sector; ConServ means the companies that belong to the Consumer Services Activity Sector; Indus means 
the companies that belong to the Industrials Activity Sector; Tech means the companies that belong to the Tecnology Activity Sector; and,  
Telecom means the companies that belong to the Telecommunication Activity Sector. 
*significant coefficient for a level of significance of 10% 
** significant coefficient for a level of significance of 5% 
*** significant coefficient for a level of significance of 1% 
Panel A: Results of the Equation (5) 
Equation (5) 
 LOGVCOMP LOGTCOMP RemVar PaySlice 
Constant 7,180*** 
(0,000) 
6,403*** 
(0,000) 
86,255*** 
(0,000) 
25,619* 
(0,092) 
ROA -0,028 0,022 -1,939 -2,231* 
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(0,520) (0,280) (0,165) (0,077) 
Risk -0,085** 
(0,070) 
-0,053** 
(0,053) 
-2,752 
(0,171) 
-0,557 
(0,759) 
Duality 0,098 
(0,594) 
-0,239*** 
(0,000) 
-8,022** 
(0,050) 
2,188 
(0,552) 
Tenure 0,007 
(0,256) 
0,005** 
(0,043) 
0,399** 
(0,043) 
0,385** 
(0,030) 
LOGAss -0,208*** 
(0,000) 
-0,068*** 
(0,003) 
-6,055*** 
(0,000) 
2,154 
(0,166) 
EqHeld -0,006* 
(0,109) 
-0,001 
(0,469) 
0,078 
(0,603) 
0,154 
(0,251) 
IndMembers -0,086 
(0,804) 
0,172 
(0,611) 
17,264 
(0,196) 
36,276*** 
(0,003) 
DebtRatio -0,170 
(0,605) 
-0,089 
(0,655) 
-28,563** 
(0,040) 
-34,017*** 
(0,007) 
CrisisD 
 
-0,012 
(0,923) 
-0,089** 
(0,037) 
-1,837 
(0,558) 
-0,809 
(0,775) 
Utili 0,101 
(0,674) 
0,233* 
(0,102) 
-12,878 
(0,199) 
-1,315 
(0,884) 
ConsGoods 0,379 
(0,113) 
0,156 
(0,223) 
5,136 
(0,568) 
-1,611 
(0,843) 
ConServ -0,402*** 
(0,017) 
-0,241** 
(0,027) 
-21,387*** 
(0,002) 
-2,672 
(0,663) 
Indus -0,435*** 
(0,006) 
-0,231** 
(0,030) 
-17,815*** 
(0,007) 
-3,575 
(0,546) 
Tech -0,326 
(0,173) 
-0,527*** 
(0,000) 
-29,303*** 
(0,000) 
0,086 
(0,989) 
Telecom 0,580*** 
(0,008) 
0,184* 
(0,106) 
16,673** 
(0,036) 
-6,937 
(0,333) 
Adj R2 0,281 0,295 0,046 -0,527 
 
Panel B: Results of the Equation (6) 
Equation (6) 
 ROA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -899,296 
(0,896) 
-1862,566* 
(0,067) 
-42,114 
(0,260) 
3,937 
(0,574) 
LOGVCOMP 128,601 
(0,895) 
   
LOGTCOMP  30,758** 
(0,054) 
  
RemVar   0,604 
(0,164) 
 
PaySlice    0,488** 
(0,058) 
Risk 10,147 
(0,897) 
1,417 
(0,266) 
0,282 
(0,816) 
-1,056 
(0,213) 
Duality 4,232 
(0,761) 
7,987** 
(0,024) 
9,276* 
(0,099) 
3,196** 
(0,058) 
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Tenure -1,206 
(0,891) 
-0,178 
(0,132) 
-0,281 
(0,206) 
-0,226* 
(0,106) 
LOGAss 24,267 
(0,899) 
1,928 
(0,239) 
2,643 
(0,331) 
-2,025** 
(0,034) 
EqHeld 0,619 
(0,902) 
0,030 
(0,627) 
-0,157 
(0,170) 
-0,181* 
(0,054) 
IndMembers 38,427 
(0,880) 
5,023 
(0,233) 
6,955 
(0,202) 
-0,975 
(0,870) 
IATA 25,061 
(0,873) 
1,534 
(0,660) 
10,751* 
(0,083) 
10,341*** 
(0,019) 
CrisisD 9,924 
(0,870) 
2,969* 
(0,100) 
2,164 
(0,319) 
1,408 
(0,330) 
Utili -6,080 
(0,928) 
-7,712 
(0,187) 
6,308 
(0,403) 
-0,768 
(0,864) 
ConsGoods -41,073 
(0,902) 
-5,521 
(0,235) 
-6,401 
(0,352) 
-2,388 
(0,547) 
ConServ 47,639 
(0,895) 
6,065 
(0,225) 
5,937 
(0,342) 
-5,409* 
(0,080) 
Indus 58,206 
(0,893) 
6,100 
0,210 
6,308 
(0,310) 
-2,537 
(0,303) 
Tech 38,392 
(0,893) 
15,246* 
(0,085) 
13,557 
(0,195) 
-4,023 
(0,262) 
Telecom -69,876 
(0,899) 
-6,211 
(0,197) 
-12,211 
(0,242) 
1,322 
(0,689) 
Adj R2 -86,196 -1,239 -2,952 -1,127 
 
Through the analysis of the Table 21 – Panel A, we can verify that the introduction 
of the different activity sectors and the dummy related to the moment of the financial 
crisis felt in Portugal allowed a greater consistency in the adjusted R2, compared to the 
previous regressions, and the proportion of variation explained by the model, when 
positive, is higher than 4,6% (considering the percentage of Variable Remuneration 
(RemVar)). The regression with the best adjusted R2 is that in which the dependent 
variable used is the natural logarithm of the CEO’s Total Remuneration (LOGTCOMP), 
and the proportion of variation explained by the model is approximately 30%. 
By analyzing the estimated coefficients for the sectorial dummies, it can be noted 
that, for a significance level of 1%, the percentage of Variable Remuneration (RemVar) 
is higher in companies of the Telecommunications sector (coefficient of 16,673 - Table 
21– Panel A). It is also possible to recognize that in the companies of the Utilities and 
Consumer Goods sectors, the estimated coefficients have little or no significance in all 
the four regressions made. 
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Regarding the estimated coefficients for the crisis dummy (CrisisD), we can 
realize that this control variable is only significant in the model, when considering the 
natural logarithm of the CEO’s Total Remuneration (LOGTCOMP) as the dependent 
variable, for a significance level of 5%, being lower during the crisis period (coefficient 
of -0,089 - Table 21 – Panel A). 
Taking into account the remaining model variables, some changes can be 
observed after inserting these control dummy variables. 
Regarding the company’s performance, as measured by the ROA, it was no longer 
significant when considering the Total Remuneration (LOGTCOMP) as the dependent 
variable, and remain significant, for a significance level of 10%, when the CEO’s Pay 
Slice (PaySlice) was considered the dependent variable (coefficient of -2,231 - Table 21– 
Panel A). These results lead us to conclude that a higher percentage of total remuneration 
of the Board paid to the CEO does not necessarily imply a better performance of the 
company. 
The risk variable, after the changes, became significant when considering the 
Total Remuneration (LOGTCOMP) as the dependent variable (coefficient of -0,053 - 
Table 21 – Panel A) and also when we considered the Variable Remuneration 
(LOGVCOMP) as the dependent variable (coefficient of -0,085 - Table 21– Panel A), 
for a significance level of 5%. These results lead us to similar conclusions: whenever the 
variable component of the remuneration increases, the risk of the company decreases.  
Regarding the variables Duality and Tenure, after the introduction of the control 
variables, they became also significant when we considered the percentage of Variable 
Remuneration (RemVar) as the dependent variable, with a significance level of 10% and 
5%, respectively. The variable Duality presents a negative coefficient, when we use Total 
Remuneration (LOGTCOMP) as dependent variable and a positive coefficient, when we 
use Variable Remuneration (LOGVCOMP) as dependent variable, which indicates that 
the variable component of the CEO’s remuneration increases when CEO performs both 
functions, CEO and Chairman, possibly indicating agency problems. Regarding Tenure, 
positive coefficients are presented in the four regressions, which leads us to conclude 
what we already expected: the remuneration increases whenever the number of years that 
the CEO stays in the same position increases. 
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Regarding the size of the company, the results remain significant and the 
conclusions are similar to those that were said in the previous regressions, referring to 
equations (1) and (2). 
The variable representing the equity held by the CEO (EqHeld) was no longer 
significant when considering the Total Remuneration (LOGTCOMP) as the dependent 
variable and became significant, for a significance level of 10%, when we consider the 
Variable Remuneration (LOGVCOMP) as the dependent variable (coefficient of -0,006 
- Table 21– Panel A). 
The variable that represents the Independent Members of the Board of Directors 
of the company (IndMembers) became only significant, for a level of significance of 1%, 
when we consider the percentage of the Total Remuneration of the Board paid to the CEO 
(PaySlice) as the dependent variable (coefficient of 36,276 - Table 21– Panel A). 
According to the Table 21– Panel B, once again, we have no explanatory power 
on the regressions included in the model. However, we have some variables that show 
some significance throughout the regressions, such as when we use the natural logarithm 
of the CEO’s Total Compensation (LOGTCOMP) or the CEO’s Pay Slice (PaySlice) as 
independent variables (without being instrumental variables). 
After we added the control variables, the relationship between pay and 
performance became positive. These results are in accordance with the Arm’s Length 
approach that defends that the executive compensation is design with proper incentives 
to create value to shareholders and to the firm (Duffhues & Kabir, 2008). 
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6.  Conclusions and Future Research 
The influence of the CEO Remuneration on the recent financial crisis brings the 
issue of the Executive Compensation on the top of public debate as one of the most 
relevant at the economic and social level. 
The present report was carried out in order to fill some gaps in the recent literature 
related to the Remunerations of the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of listed Portuguese 
companies on Euronext Lisbon. 
This study has a sample composed of information of 37 Portuguese companies 
from 2008 to 2016. Several information was collected according to Corporate 
Governance of the company and also some accounting data, in order to respond to some 
hypotheses established in the beginning of this report. 
The first hypothesis was to study the impact of the CEO’s Remuneration on the 
performance of the companies. However, no empirical evidence has been found that, in 
Portugal, at the time of the recent financial crisis, the CEO’s Remuneration is determined 
by the Performance of the company and vice versa, in other words, the company’s 
Performance is not determined by the Remuneration of the CEO. 
The second hypothesis was to ensure that high CEO’s Remuneration would 
positively impact the risk appetite of CEOs, thereby causing corporate risk to increase as 
remunerations increase. It would be expected that companies that bet on riskier projects 
would better remunerate their managers. According to the study, what we conclude was 
exactly the opposite. In reality, as CEO Remuneration increases, corporate risk decreases, 
that is, the risk variable does not significantly determine Remuneration. 
The third and last hypothesis tested deals with the power attributed to the figure 
of the CEO and the Remuneration of the same. Power was measured through variables 
such as duality, tenure and equity held. We tried to see if, as these variables increased, 
CEO Remuneration would increase, and the final conclusion goes against what has 
already been achieved by most of the literature: remuneration increases with increasing 
CEO power. A regression was also performed in which the variable CEO’s Pay Slice 
would be the dependent variable. CEO’s Pay Slice represents the percentage of the CEO’s 
Remuneration over the total remuneration paid to the Board of Directors members and it 
was possible to conclude that as the power variables increased, the CEO’s Pay Slice 
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variable also increased, as expected, because they both represent the power of the CEO 
in a company. 
As concluded in previous studies, such as Nascimento (2009), we can conclude 
that preponderant factor for the determination of Remuneration does not necessarily pass 
through the Performance of the Company, but rather through its Dimension. 
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8. Appendix 
Table 22 – Listed firms of the sample 
This table shows the list of all listed firms of the sample, containing information about the composition of their Board 
and the name of the CEO that was in charge on the beginning of this study (2008) and the one that was in charge in the 
end of the study (2016).  
 Members of the Board12 (2016) CEO 
Corporation Executive Non-Executive 2008 2016 
Independent Non-
Independent 
1. ALTRI 4 0 3 Paulo 
Fernandes 
Paulo 
Fernandes 
2. BCP – MILLENIUM - - - - - 
3. BPI - - - - - 
4. Banco Santander - - - - - 
5. Benfica - - - - - 
6. Cofina 2 0 3 Paulo 
Fernandes 
Paulo 
Fernandes 
7. Compta 5 0 0 Armindo 
Monteiro 
Armindo 
Monteiro 
8. Corticeira Amorim 3 0 3 António 
Amorim 
António 
Amorim 
9. CTT Correios 5 6 1 Estanislau 
Costa 
Francisco 
de Lacerda 
10. EDP 7 0 0 António 
Mexia 
António 
Mexia 
11. EDP Renováveis 5 10 2 António 
Mexia 
João Neto 
12. Estoril Sol 4 0 7 Stanley Ho Pansy Ho 
13. F. Ramada 4 0 1 João de 
Oliveira 
João de 
Oliveira 
14. FCP - - - - - 
15. Galp 7 5 7 Manuel de 
Oliveira 
Carlos da 
Silva 
16. Glintt 5 1 8 Fernando 
Freire 
Nuno Lopes 
17. Ibersol 2 1 0 António 
Teixeira 
António 
Teixeira 
18. Imobiliária Construtora Grão-
Pará 
2 0 1 Abel 
Pinheiro 
Abel 
Pinheiro 
                                               
12 According to the Instituto Português de Corporate Governance, there are three types of members of the Board: 
independents, executives and non-executives. The executive member is the one who actively performs management functions; the 
non-executive member is the one who does not perform management functions and he is not linked to the company; the independent 
member is the one who is not associated to the company’s interests and he is not in a position to affect his exemption from analysis 
or decision. 
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19. Impresa 1 3 4 Francisco 
Pinto 
Balsemão 
Francisco 
Pedro Pinto 
Balsemão 
20. Inapa 4 4 0 José 
Morgado 
Diogo 
Rezende 
21. ISA - Intelligent Sensing 
Anywhere 
- - - - - 
22. Jerónimo Martins 1 3 7 - Pedro 
Soares dos 
Santos 
23. Lisgráfica 3 0 1 - Luciano 
Patrão 
24. Luz Saúde 4 4 0 Isabel Vaz Isabel Vaz 
25. Martifer 3 2 1 Carlos 
Martins 
Jorge 
Martins 
26. Media Capital 1 3 3 Manuel 
Polanco 
Rosa 
Cullell 
27. Mota Engil 8 3 6 Jorge 
Coelho 
Gonçalo 
Martins 
28. Nexponor - Sicafi - - - - - 
29. NOS 5 5 6 Rodrigo 
Costa 
Miguel 
Almeida 
30. Novabase 2 0 2 Luís 
Salvado 
Luís 
Salvado 
31. Orey Antunes 2 6 0 Duarte 
D’Orey 
Duarte 
D’Orey 
32. Patris - - - - - 
33. Pharol 2 4 5 Zeinal Bava Luís Silva 
34. Reditus 2 0 3 Frederico 
Rato 
Francisco 
Ramos 
35. REN 3 4 5 José 
Penedos 
Rodrigo 
Costa 
36. SAG Gest - - - - - 
37. SDC Investimentos 2 1 1 Pedro 
Gonçalves 
António 
Henriques 
38. Semapa 4 2 5 Pedro 
Pereira 
Pedro 
Pereira 
39. SONAE 2 7 0 Duarte de 
Azevedo 
Duarte de 
Azevedo 
40. SONAE Capital 3 2 2 Belmiro de 
Azevedo 
Maria 
Cláudia de 
Azevedo 
41. SONAE Com 2 7 7 Angelo 
Paupério 
Angelo 
Paupério 
42. Sporting - - - - - 
43. SUMOL+COMPAL 4 3 0 Duarte 
Pinto 
Duarte 
Pinto 
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44. Teixeira Duarte 8 0 0 - Pedro 
Teixeira 
Duarte 
45. The Navigator 3 0 9 José 
Honório 
Diogo da 
Silveira 
46. Toyota Caetano 5 0 3 Salvador 
Caetano 
José Ramos 
47. VAA - Vista Alegre Atlantis 5 0 2 Bernardo 
Souza 
Lázaro de 
Sousa 
 
Table 23 – Dependent and Independent Variables 
Name Definition 
LOGTCOMP The natural logarithm of the absolute value of the Total Remuneration of the CEO. 
LOGVCOMP The natural logarithm of the absolute value of the Variable Remuneration of the CEO. 
RemVar The percentage of the Variable Remuneration of the CEO. 
PaySlice The percentage of the total compensation paid to the executives of the Board that belongs 
to the CEO. 
ROA The Return on Assets ratio that measures the performance of the company. 
Risk The variance of the weekly returns. 
Duality A dummy variable that equals to one when the CEO also holds the position of the Chairman 
of the board and zero otherwise. 
Tenure The number of years that a CEO remains in his job. 
LOGAss The natural logarithm of the absolute value of the Total Assets of the company. 
EqHeld The percentage of the number of shares held by the CEO of a company. 
DebtRatio The Debt Ratio of the companies. 
IATA The Intangible Assets to Total Assets Ratio of the companies. 
 
Table 24 - Descriptive Statistics for the Performance of the Companies per year 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the performance of the companies of the sample, measured by 
the Return on Assets (ROA), that is the ratio of EBIT to the book value of the firm’s total assets.  
  Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
2008 3,57% 3,47% -19,63% 30,12% 
2009 4,21% 4,52% -25,63% 18,68% 
2010 2,87% 4,47% -46,44% 23,50% 
2011 5,22% 4,25% -6,39% 32,31% 
2012 4,78% 4,28% -14,82% 35,93% 
2013 3,65% 4,05% -39,05% 36,47% 
2014 4,96% 4,81% -10,00% 24,04% 
2015 3,78% 2,69% -7,20% 24,70% 
2016 2,71% 1,94% -29,85% 35,86% 
TOTAL 3,97% 4,25% -46,44% 36,47% 
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Table 25 - Descriptive Statistics for the Performance according to the Benchmark per year 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the performance of the companies of the sample, measured by 
the Return on Assets (ROA), that is the ratio of EBIT to the book value of the firm’s total assets, according to a 
benchmark. This benchmark was computed using a ratio: ROA of the company to the ROA of the activity sector of 
each company of the sample, in order to measure the performance of the companies, according to the sector in which 
they are inserted. 
  Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
2008 -6,41% 33,44% -1016,00% 217,51% 
2009 50,21% 53,95% -476,31% 263,81% 
2010 38,91% 33,11% -391,00% 267,80% 
2011 107,21% 55,37% -145,25% 970,59% 
2012 101,93% 57,49% -1073,76% 1473,97% 
2013 12,15% 43,80% -1525,32% 375,95% 
2014 40,27% 50,06% -198,33% 183,80% 
2015 29,21% 28,42% -259,15% 233,90% 
2016 17,34% 18,21% -356,67% 233,90% 
TOTAL 43,43% 43,80% -1525,32% 1473,97% 
Table 26 - Descriptive Statistics for the Composition of the Board of Directors per year 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the number of the members of the Board of Directors, as well 
as for its composition of executives, non-executives and independent members and the existence of a Remuneration 
Committee, per each year in our study. 
   
Total Executives Non Executives Independents 
Remuneration 
Committee 
20
08
 
Mean 8,88 4,41 4,47 1,84 2,63 
Minimum 3 2 0 0 0 
Maximum 21 9 17 9 4 
20
09
 
Mean 9,15 4,41 4,68 1,59 2,52 
Minimum 3 2 0 0 0 
Maximum 25 9 18 10 3 
20
10
 
Mean 9,34 4,31 5,09 1,77 2,54 
Minimum 3 2 0 0 0 
Maximum 20 9 16 10 3 
20
11
 
Mean 9,53 4,42 5,11 1,61 2,69 
Minimum 3 2 0 0 0 
Maximum 24 9 17 8 3 
20
12
 
Mean 9,73 4,11 5,62 1,84 2,62 
Minimum 3 1 0 0 0 
Maximum 24 9 17 8 3 
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20
13
 
Mean 9,78 4,05 5,73 2,16 2,59 
Minimum 3 1 0 0 0 
Maximum 21 9 14 9 3 
20
14
 
Mean 9,46 3,78 5,68 2,43 2,59 
Minimum 3 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 20 7 18 9 3 
20
15
 
Mean 8,81 3,59 5,22 2,16 2,76 
Minimum 3 1 0 0 0 
Maximum 19 7 12 9 3 
20
16
 
Mean 8,53 3,64 4,89 2,14 2,72 
Minimum 3 1 0 0 0 
Maximum 19 8 12 10 3 
 
Table 27 - Descriptive Statistics for the Total Remuneration (in €) of the CEO of a company per year 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the Total Remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
of a company, per each year in our study. 
  
Number of 
Observations 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
2008 32 428034,67 338169,46 34837,11 1534805,50 
2009 34 521318,15 327975,91 33459,00 2525093,00 
2010 35 519243,34 376750,00 59357,06 1532491,00 
2011 35 550620,20 378017,00 59357,06 2355943,00 
2012 36 501678,97 365522,33 59357,06 1794430,00 
2013 37 509577,34 350320,00 21199,00 1770108,43 
2014 37 435251,35 390850,00 0 1719000,00 
2015 37 492648,90 355917,00 0 2039211,00 
2016 35 450984,57 299687,00 0 1514246,00 
TOTAL 318 489928,61 355917,00 0 2525093,00 
 
  Mean (Log) 
2008 12,97 
2009 13,16 
2010 13,16 
2011 13,22 
2012 13,13 
2013 13,14 
2014 12,98 
2015 13,11 
2016 13,02 
TOTAL 13,10 
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Table 28 - Descriptive Statistics for the Fixed Remuneration (in €) of the CEO of a company per year 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the Fixed Remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
of a company, per each year in our study. 
  
Number of 
Observations 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
2008 32 290395,67 250347,50 34837,11 700567,25 
2009 34 322078,44 252950,00 33459,00 1069600,00 
2010 35 362765,54 365400,00 49182,00 1069600,00 
2011 35 342607,31 317166,09 0,00 1069600,00 
2012 36 322235,70 280687,92 10500,00 1069600,00 
2013 37 323171,90 280000,00 21199,00 1069600,00 
2014 37 310357,26 301944,00 0,00 1069600,00 
2015 37 319778,01 279750,00 0,00 972740,68 
2016 35 303072,44 241800,00 0,00 983908,00 
TOTAL 318 321829,14 280000,00 0,00 1069600,00 
 
  Mean (Log) 
2008 12,58 
2009 12,68 
2010 12,80 
2011 12,74 
2012 12,68 
2013 12,69 
2014 12,65 
2015 12,68 
2016 12,62 
TOTAL 12,68 
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Table 29 - Descriptive Statistics for the Variable Remuneration (in €) of the CEO of a company per year 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the Variable Remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) of a company, per each year in our study. 
  
Number of 
Observations 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
2008 32 137639,00 50019,55 0,00 834238,25 
2009 34 199239,71 57582,00 0,00 1813507,00 
2010 35 156477,80 46662,00 0,00 721921,00 
2011 35 208012,89 1386,00 0,00 1660905,00 
2012 36 179443,28 46440,62 0,00 1099392,00 
2013 37 186405,44 61800,00 0,00 1339800,00 
2014 37 124894,10 17118,29 0,00 778800,00 
2015 37 172870,89 935,34 0,00 1578511,00 
2016 35 147912,13 2500,00 0,00 1053546,00 
TOTAL 318 168099,47 46440,62 0,00 1813507,00 
 
  Mean (Log) 
2008 11,83 
2009 12,20 
2010 11,96 
2011 12,25 
2012 12,10 
2013 12,14 
2014 11,74 
2015 12,06 
2016 11,90 
TOTAL 12,03 
 
Table 30 - Descriptive Statistics for Percentage of Variable Remuneration of the CEO per year 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the percentage of variable remuneration of the CEO. 
  Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
2008 22,09% 19,72% 0,00% 70,75% 
2009 23,70% 20,88% 0,00% 71,82% 
2010 20,31% 20,00% 0,00% 61,89% 
2011 23,22% 0,35% 0,00% 100,00% 
2012 23,56% 14,04% 0,00% 94,69% 
2013 24,26% 15,90% 0,00% 75,69% 
2014 17,82% 6,67% 0,00% 73,46% 
2015 19,44% 0,52% 0,00% 77,41% 
2016 20,06% 0,80% 0,00% 69,58% 
TOTAL 21,61% 14,04% 0,00% 100,00% 
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Table 31 - Descriptive Statistics for the CEO’s pay slice per year 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the percentage of the total compensation paid to the executives 
of the Board that belongs to the CEO. 
  Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
2008 35,94% 30,00% 6,35% 86,58% 
2009 35,01% 34,28% 2,35% 77,36% 
2010 34,59% 36,12% 0,54% 76,84% 
2011 36,20% 32,08% 12,49% 85,23% 
2012 35,09% 30,60% 12,25% 74,43% 
2013 35,17% 30,64% 11,42% 79,89% 
2014 30,97% 27,85% 0,00% 74,52% 
2015 32,79% 27,54% 0,00% 82,52% 
2016 36,25% 32,79% 0,00% 100,00% 
TOTAL 34,67% 30,64% 0,00% 100,00% 
 
Table 32 -– Descriptive Statistics for the Proportion of Capital of the company held by the CEO per year 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the percentage of the number of shares held by the CEO of a 
company, per each year in our study. 
  Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
2008 4,12% 0,05% 0,00% 74,62% 
2009 4,05% 0,02% 0,00% 72,72% 
2010 4,17% 0,07% 0,00% 73,42% 
2011 4,52% 0,01% 0,00% 79,01% 
2012 4,53% 0,06% 0,00% 79,39% 
2013 4,27% 0,01% 0,00% 77,11% 
2014 4,23% 0,00% 0,00% 77,11% 
2015 4,25% 0,00% 0,00% 77,50% 
2016 4,48% 0,01% 0,00% 77,50% 
TOTAL 4,29% 0,01% 0,00% 79,39% 
 
 
Table 33  – Descriptive Statistics for the Tenure of the CEO per year 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the number of years that a CEO remains in his job. 
  Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
2008 7,21 3 0 48 
2009 7,31 3 0 49 
2010 7,60 4 0 50 
2011 6,78 4 0 29 
2012 6,86 5 0 30 
2013 7,03 6 0 31 
2014 6,38 5 0 24 
2015 7,00 6 0 25 
2016 7,20 5 0 26 
TOTAL 7,04 5 0 50 
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Table 34 - Descriptive Statistics for the Duality of the CEO per year 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the duality of a CEO.  
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
2008 0,56 1 0 1 
2009 0,51 1 0 1 
2010 0,49 0 0 1 
2011 0,53 1 0 1 
2012 0,49 0 0 1 
2013 0,43 0 0 1 
2014 0,51 1 0 1 
2015 0,49 0 0 1 
2016 0,49 0 0 1 
TOTAL 0,50 0 0 1 
 
 
Table 35 - Descriptive Statistics for the Standard Deviation of Weekly Returns per year 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the standard deviation of weekly returns of the companies. We 
used the natural logarithm of the standard deviation volatility calculated over 2008-2016.  
  
Number of 
Observations 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
2008 33 0,277 0,076 0,024 6,672 
2009 33 0,068 0,050 0,020 0,394 
2010 34 0,443 0,043 0,021 13,142 
2011 34 0,084 0,054 0,014 0,437 
2012 34 0,090 0,050 0,022 0,497 
2013 35 0,066 0,049 0,022 0,270 
2014 36 0,077 0,055 0,017 0,286 
2015 36 0,072 0,053 0,029 0,388 
2016 36 0,104 0,049 0,027 1,409 
TOTAL 311 0,142 0,050 0,014 13,142 
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Table 36 - Descriptive Statistics for the Debt Ratio per year 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the Debt Ratio of the companies. This ratio was computed as 
the sum of long-term and short-term debt to the total assets 
  
Number of 
Observations 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
2008 37 24,12% 22,46% 0,00% 65,55% 
2009 37 24,54% 23,26% 0,00% 77,44% 
2010 36 23,49% 26,92% 0,00% 72,13% 
2011 37 22,95% 24,10% 0,00% 72,49% 
2012 37 20,63% 16,51% 0,00% 53,88% 
2013 37 26,04% 27,08% 0,00% 90,71% 
2014 37 24,66% 25,67% 0,00% 68,96% 
2015 35 21,14% 16,52% 0,00% 76,39% 
2016 34 20,18% 13,33% 0,00% 69,45% 
TOTAL 327 23,09% 23,26% 0,00% 90,71% 
 
 
Table 37 – Descriptive Statistics for the Intangible Assets to Total Assets Ratio per year 
This table shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the Intangible Assets to Total Assets Ratio of the companies. 
  
Number of 
Observations 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
2008 37 18,01% 8,95% 0,00% 84,16% 
2009 37 20,86% 13,35% 0,00% 84,38% 
2010 36 21,33% 12,65% 0,00% 78,01% 
2011 37 21,31% 12,07% 0,00% 76,68% 
2012 37 22,39% 14,69% 0,00% 83,12% 
2013 37 21,47% 14,27% 0,00% 87,00% 
2014 37 18,59% 10,83% 0,00% 83,50% 
2015 35 13,32% 3,66% 0,00% 89,32% 
2016 34 12,96% 2,11% 0,00% 98,72% 
TOTAL 327 18,92% 12,07% 0,00% 98,72% 
 
